University of St. Thomas Law Journal
Volume 5
Issue 3 Spring 2008

Article 9

2008

Politics, Executive Dominance, and Transformative
Law in the Culture of Judicial Independence
John C. Reitz

Bluebook Citation
John C. Reitz, Politics, Executive Dominance, and Transformative Law in the Culture of Judicial Independence, 5 U. St. Thomas L.J. 743
(2008).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UST Research Online and the University of St. Thomas Law Journal. For more information,
please contact lawjournal@stthomas.edu.

ARTICLE

POLITICS, EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE, AND
TRANSFORMATIVE LAW IN THE CULTURE
OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

JmlN

C.

REfTZ*

ABSTRACT

In the last two decades Latin America has experienced a significant
resurgence of democracy, yet efforts to strengthen the independcnce of the
judiciary, largely focused on institutional reforms of the judiciary itself,
have been disappointing. It is apparently not enough to construct an appropriate judiciary. How can one keep the nation's politicians from trying to
control the judges? Through a wide-ranging historical and comparative
method. this article seeks to explore the culture of judicial independence by
asking what the political and social logic in favor of and opposed to judicial
independence is. This article seeks to contribute to the cultural approach,
first by understanding the enduring strength of the opposing culture, the
culture supporting political control over the courts, and second, by exploring the argument that a belief in law's ability to transform society characterizes cultures supporting reasonable levels of judicial independence. If belief
in transformative law is an important feature of the culture of judicial independence, then perhaps that belief can be deployed against the perennial
claims for political control. Strategies designed to strengthen belief in transformative law by improving the effectiveness of laws intended to be transformative, it is argued, could be promising ways of supplementing
institutional reforms by increasing cultural support for judicial
independence.
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The argument starts by using the ancient Chinese debate over law and
morality and the resulting dynastic Chinese legal system as a springboard
for examining the culture that supports the primacy of politics. In the sense
of that debate, politics is the primary competitor for law, and we can see
that the tension bctween law and politics remains relevant for all societies,
even or perhaps especially, for democracies. The ever-present strength of
this competition meanS that it is counterproductive and wrong to conceive
of judicial independence as a goal in and of itself. The ideal has to be,
rather, a reasonable balance between judicial independence and political influence or oversight over the judges. The strength of the competition from a
commitment to politics also explains why, in a modern democracy, it is the
executive branch that tends to pose the chief threat to the independence of
the judiciary. The executive is the political branch that is organized in a
way that gives it the greatest capacity to exercise political influence over
the judges.
The transformative law thesis addresses this competition between judicial independence and executive dominance over the judges. The basic argument is that the need to create structural protections for the judges such
as limitations on executive involvement in the appointment, promotion, disciplining, and dismissal of judges becomes obvious to a broad public in the
case of law th8t is expected to change society. The argument draws on
scholarship comparing Western law with traditional Tslamic law, another
society with a developed legal tradition but one that does not appear to have
been characterized by either transformative law or structural protections for
judicial independence. It also uses a model proposed by Martin Shapiro for
examining basic issues concerning the legitimacy of courts. An overview of
the development of structural protections for judicial independence in the
United States, France, and Great Britain provides some evidence in support
of the transformative law thesis because in each of these countries, the development of significant institutional protections is associated with the development of judicial review of legislation, a form of public law that I argue
constitutes an important source of transformative law. The article concludes
with a discussion of some of the key values that appear to be associated
with a culture committed to the transformative view of law, especially impersonal application of the law and an interest in strengthening equality.
and a brief exploration of several suggestions for further reform in Latin
America that would be warranted by the transfonnative thesis.
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INTRODUCTION

Judicial independence is commonly said to be at the heart of virtually
all conceptions of the rule of law.' For that reason, all arounel the world,
efforts to strengthen the rule of law often focus on reforms of the judiciary 2
In Latin America, the wave of democratization in the 1980s was followed
by a wave of judicial reform projects in the 1990s, primarily focusing on
institutional models anel procedures, often modeled expressly on developed
country institutions.' But a substantial body of commentary has viewed the
I. See, e,g., Ralf Dahrendorf, A C0I1fusiuII (!t PrFII'ers.' Politics ({lid the Rllfe of La1l', 40
MODERN L. REV. I> 9 (1977); Lydia Brashear Tiede, J!rdicia/ Independence: Oftell Cited, /?orely
UIJc/el"sfOod, 15 J, CONTEJ\-1P. LEGf\!. ISSUES 119, 129 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Hiram E, Chodosh, Emergellceji'OII1 the Dilel11l1w.\' ofJI1Slice Reform, 38 TEX.
INT'L LJ. 587(2003) (discussing problems ofjuclicial reform in a number of coul1lfics).
3.

MMH(

U.'JGAR,

ELUSIVE REr-ORM:

DE\10CRACY

AND THE RULE OF

LAW

IN LATIN

AMEfUC'A 140-41 (2002) (newly democratic regimes in Latin America focused judicial reforms on
four areas: (,1) selection and appointment, (2) training and discipline, (3) criminal procedure, and
(4) finances); Jorge L. EsquiroJ, The FlIiled L(lW of Latin America, 56 AM. J. Cm.1P. L. 75, 95
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results as basically disappointing" The persisting problems are said to include widespread popular distrust of the judiciary,S violence against the judlciary,6 "inefficiency, corruption, and resistance to reform,"? and even
excessive independence on the part of the judges and lack of sufficient accountability' In fact, there are calls for greater judicial accountability,"
But most ominous are the ways that executive branches in a number of
countries have sought to undermine judicial independence through court
packing and other direct intervenLons in the judiciary, JO For reasons
(2008) (emphasis on inslilution-building); id. at 99 (democratization and judicial reform); Carlos
Suntiso, The F:fusive Quesr jor the Rille of Law: Promoting l!ldicia! Reform ill Laril! Americ(/, 23
BR,-\ZILiAN J. POL. ECON. 112, 132 (2003) (the "mirage of 'instituLional modeling'" led to replication of developed country models; "[i]t was naively assumed that the adoption of new lmvs and

the creations of new judicial institutions would suffice to anchor the nile of law").
4. See, e.g., LINN HAI'.IMEROREN, ENVISIONING REFORM 3 (2007) (describing reforms that
began in the early 1980s as tbcLlsed on institutions and procedures); WILLlA'I'I C. PRILLAMAN, THE
Jl'DICIARY AND DEfl10CRATIC DECAY IN LATIN AMERICA: DECLINING CONf'IDENCE IN TilE RCLE OF
LAW 8, 19 (2000); Christina Biebesheimer, Justice Reform in Lmin America alld the C(/ribbean:
The lOB Perspective, ill RULE OF LAW I~ LATIN AMERICA: THE INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION Of'
JUDICIAL RErORl'd 99, 99-100 (Pilar Domingo & Rachel Sieder eds., 2001); Pilar Domingo &
Rachel Sieder, COllclusions: Promoting the Rull! of Law in L[lfill America, in THE RVLE Or LAW
IN LATIN AMERICA: THE INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION 01' lLlDlCIAL REFORM 142, 151 (Pilar Domingo & Rachel Sieder eds., 2001); Juan C. Mendez, lnsfiwtion(/I Reform, Inefuding Acces.\ to
Justice: Iwmdllcfioll, ill THE (TJN)RIfT F OF I.AW AND TH" lJNDERPR1VII.EC,FD IN LATIN AMERICA
221 (Juan Mendez et al. eds., 1999). But see Esquiroi, SIIpra note 3 (arguing that the rhetoric of
"failed law" in Latin America is a destructive overgeneralization thaL undermines law in the region and distorts the refol'ln agenda).
We have also been warned nOL Lo ovc.rgcl1eralize about Latin American countries because
there is no monolithic Latin American culture. Daniel Brinks, Judicial Reform WId Illdepem/ell(.'l!
i/l Endl and Argellfi!l(/: The Beginnillg of (/ New Milfenllillm?, 40 TEX. lNT'L LJ. 595 (2005);
Esquirol, .wpm note 3, at 84-85 ("there is 110 such thing as 'Latin American law' in general";
recognizing that tbere are, however, strong commonalities among Latin American countries and
certain common prohlems with their legal systems, but arguing against overgeneralization of those
critiques). I will try to avoid the worst excesses of gencralization by specifying in the citations as
carefully as possible which countries are the source for the various facts and opinions on whkh
my argument relies.
5. PR!LLAMAN, slfjJm note 4, at 8; Domingo & Sieder, slIpra note 4, at 151; Linn Hammergren, E.rpandillff the Rille oILal'.': Judiciol R~f'orl/l il! Latin Alllericu, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD.
L. REV, 60[,603-04 (2005).
6. PRILLAMAN, supra note 4, at 21 (Colombia).
7. Domingo & Sieder, slIpm note 4, at 147.
8. PRILLAMAN. supro note 4, at 21-·22 (Bolivia, Ecuador); Brinks, supra note 4, at 613-21
(Brazil); Santiso, slIpra nole 3, at 118-22 (Brazil).
9. Mary Dakolias, Atrackillg Corruption ill tire Judiciwy; A Criti('(l{ Process ill Jwficiul
R(/imll, 18 WIS. INT'L LJ. 353, 376 (2000); (j: T. Leigh Anenson, Note, For Whom the Befl Tolls
... Judicial Selecfioll by Electioll ill Larin America, -+ Sw. J.L. & TRc\DE AM. 261 (1997) (U.S.
Imv "WdeHt advocating ekction of judges in Latin America).
10. See, e.g., PR1!.l.AtI.'(,.l,.N, .\'11])/'(/ note 4, at 19-20; UNGAR, slIpra note 3, at 143 ("[E]xecLltive
rarely loses its determination to stock the judiciary with friendly judges, sidelining new ll1eritbased procedures in the process, and practices such as patl'Onage, fnvoritism, and discriminatory
prosecution are engrained into internal judicial fLlllctioning."); Lauren Castaldi, NOLe, Juilicial
IlIiIe/lel/dence Threafened in Vene::'III!1l/; The Rt'IJIOI'(11 uf Vellez'!lefan Judges and flu' COlllpli('(/lions {?{ Rille (!f'L(/\1' Re,{()J'IJ/, 37 OED. J. INT'L L. 477 (2006) (detailed accounL of ways th([L
Chavez :lchninistration hit;; undermined Venezuelan court independence; even when the restriction::. h~l\e formally been imposed by legislature or independent commission. the executivt' has
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explained below, this article concentrates on the threat of executive
dominance. 11
The persistence of executive interference with the courts despite recent
democratization seems paradoxical in view of the widespread belief that
judicial independence matters to democracy, as well as the rule of law. In
an authoritarian state in which the I1Jling party uses force to maintain its
hold on power, only a relatively small group of people, the ruler and his
supporters, determine public policy. Their self-interest is obviously served
by seeking to control the judiciary, which otherwise could be an arm .of
state power they do not control. There is no need for any further explanation for the pattern of executive efforts to control the courts. But today
many countries throughout Latin America are characterized by a resurgence
of significant levels of competitive democratic participation. Why do the
electorates not demand more independent courts? Why do they not insist on
"institntional" or "structural" gnarantees of judicial independence such as
rules on appointment, promotion, discipline, and dismissal of judges or
guarantees of pay that eliminate or limit executive branch authority over the
judges?12 More importantly, why do tlley let politicians ignore or eliminate
been able to dominate the process); Hugo FrCihling, Judicial Reform (mel Democratization in Latin
America, in FAULT LINES OF DEMOCRACY IN POS';"~TRANSITION LATIN AMERICA 237, 237 (Felipe
Aguero & Jeffrey Stark eds., 1998) (Latin American courts "are neither independent nor effec,
tive"; they have "suffered from political manipulation by both democratic and military governments"); Jose Alberto Ramirez Leon, Why Further Development of ADR in Latin America Makes
Sense: The Vellezuelan Model, 2005 J. Drsp. RESOL. 399 (C01l11 packing in Venezuela); Jon Mills,
Prillciples for Constitutions and Institutions in Promoting the Rule of Law, 16 FLA. 1. INT'L L. 115
(2004) (limiting tenure, court packing, purges, restricting jurisdiction by creating special tribu,
l1als); Santiso, supra note 3, at 119 (Menem's court packing in Argentina); (f. Keith S. Rosenn,
The Protection of Judicia/Independence in Latin America, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1
(1987) (long historical tradition in many Latin American countries of techniques like formally
abrogating judicial independence, bypassing courts by creating special tribunals, purges of judges,
transference or reassignment of judges, refusing to enforce decisions, and other forms of executive
domination).
11, For argument that execlltive dominance is the cbief threat to judicial independence, see
infra section II(B). See also PRILLAMAN, supra note 4, at 19-20; UNGAR, supra note 3, at 143
("Executive power and judicial weakness ... limit reforms' effectiveness."); cf Tiede, supra note
1, at 131-32 (defining judicial independence as independence from the executive branch on the
grounds that this definition gives the most meaningful, analytically useful measure).
Bribery is also a threat to judicial independence, probably in aU countries to some extent, but
it is difficult to gauge the relative seriousness of the problem in different countries. Moreover, it
may simply be the way executive dominance is exercised, see, e.g., ADRIAAN BEDNER, ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS IN INDONESIA 237 (2001) (executive branch bribes judges in Indonesia), or a
method of resistance to executive dominance. See LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE CULTURE OF ISLAM:
CHANGING ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM LIFE 66-67 (2002) (quoting Moroccan informants as saying that bribery is their form of democracy because it is through bribery of officials
that they can limit the ruler's power). At any rate, executive dominance is essentially a different
problem from bribe!';'. Section II will argue that it is systemic, and wlinging our hands over
conuption may obscure cultural features that support executive dominance over the courts.
J 2. Throughout the paper, and especially in section IV, I use the adoption of institutional or
structural protections for judges as evidence of the strength of ,a culture supportive of judicial
independence. It is, of course, only a rough measure. Institutional proleclions do not guarantee
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existing institutional guarantees? If electcci leaders can dominate the judiciary and there are popular calls to make the judges politically more answerable, then we have to take seriously the possibility that even in a democracy
there can be a broad population with a set of attitudes, values, and ideologies-in short, a "culture" 13-that supports significant political controls on
the judiciary. What is it that promotes that culture or its opposite, a culture
that supports reasonable stlUctural protections for judicial independence?l4
This article concentrates on understanding the dynamic in a democratic
state that determines the balance between the culture of judicial independence and the culture of executive dominance. My assumption is that if we
can identify mechanisms that promote the culture of judicial independence
among the population at large, then reformers interested in strengthening
judicial independence can devise strategies to put that dynamic to work, and
we will also be able to identify which values appear to be associated with
that dynamic. The article pursues this topic through two related lines of
inquiry, using a wide-ranging and perhaps idiosyncratic historical and compm'ative method that starts with two older, non-Western l5 legal systems that
judicial independence if politicians fail to respect the structural protections or easily amend or
circumvent the laws establishing the protections. See, e.g., Brinks, supra note 4, at 608 (Argentina); Castaldi, supra note 10 (Chavez's efforts in Venezuela to undermine judicial independence);
Robert Stevens, The Independence o/the Judiciary; The Ca.ye of England, 72 S. CAL. L REV. 597,
601 (1999) (Prime Minister Lloyd George required his Lord Chief Justice to sign an undated letter
of resignation upon his appointment in 1921, which he then used to remove that judge in 1922). It
is also possible, though not probable, that judges could have substantial independence without the
benefit of such protections. See infra note 144 (some commentators viewed French administrative
law judges as significantly independent even before the recent institutional reforms); note 165
(Shapiro's claim of the de facto independence of the British judges); note 170 (Islamic judges).
But the adoption of institutional safeguards is at least the expression of a polity's belief that
judicial independence is important.
13. I do not think it is necessary for this paper to identify exactly whose culture I am speaking about. The important point is that the relevant group for these questions of culture is not
necessarily limited to the judges and the leaders of the execlltive branch. It is a broader group.
There are at least three possibilities: (a) the mass public as a whole; or (b) the legal elite of bench,
bar, and legal academe; or (c) the broader elite that is formed by lawyers and aU nonlawyers who
engage in a significant and professional way with law ancl the courts, such as the representatives
of the media who report on legal matters and perhaps even business leaders who make signitlcant
lise of legal services. Probably, at different times and on different issues, one or another of these
groups may be most important. I also understand "culture" to refer in general to a combination of,
on the one hand, attitudes, values, and ideologies, and, on the other, behavior. Behavior such as
tolerating or not tolerating executive interference with the courts or enacting institutional restraints
on executive control of the courts can be strong evidence of attitudes, values, or ideology and may
also shape and foster those attitudinal aspects of culture.
14. The article thus joins those who adopt a culture-based approach to the problem of judicial
independence to supplement the institutional approach. See, e.g., Martin Krygier, The Rille of
Law: Legality, Teleolog)'! Sociology, in RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW {Oianluigi Palombella &
Neil Walker eds., 2008) (arguing for a sociology of the rule of law); Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil's
Legal Culture: The leito Revisited, 1 FLA. 1. INT'L L. 1 (1984); Miguel Schor, Constitutionalism
Through the Looking Glass of Latin America, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1. 35 (2006) (exploring the
"social moorings" for constitutionalism).
15. The dichotomy between the ;'West" and the rest is problematic in many ways, not the
least of which is that some of my chief informOltion about Islamic law comes from scholarship
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did not develop institutional protecl'ions for judicial independence, ancient
Chinese law and traditional Islamic law.
Section II opens the first line of inquiry concerning one of the chief
arguments for political influence over the judges that continues to have
force today. the claim for the primacy of politics. My theory is that we
cannot appreciate the dynamic that might favor judicial independence unless we also understand the opposite. 16 Section II uses the ancient Chinese
debate about governing a society through law or morality-a debate that
resulted in a pronOlll1ced preference for morality over law-as a springboard for this inquiry. Because of the continuing power of the claim for the
primacy of politics, this section argues, it is wrong to conceive of the rule of
law ideal as requiring completely independent judges. The ideal has to be,
rather, a reasonable balance between judicial independence and political influence or oversight over the judiciary. This point is not new; other scholars
have emphasized the need for balance within the rule of law paradigm.17
The sharpness of the contrast with the very different legal system of dynastic China is meant to provide a fresh presentation of the argument to
counteract standard rule of law rhetoric claiming that judges should simply
be independent. The contrast also is meant to help us see with greater clarity the importance for law of a value that was explicitly rejected in the
Chinese debate, equality under the law. Section II closes with the argument
that the contil1Lling attraction of politicd control over the judges explains
why it is the executive branch in modern democracies that tends to pose the
chief threat to judicial independence, as we see in Latin America.
about M_orocco, and Morocco extends further to the west than much of Western Europe, including
France. Nevertheless, I use the term "modern Western legal traditions" to refer to the legal traditions of those countries in Western Europe ancl North America, as well as Australia and New
Zealand, which are generally thought to institute the strongest or least problematic forms of the
rule of law today. By using that terminology, I do not mean to suggest either that the legal systems
of these countries perfectly fit the rule of law ideal or that Latin America is not part of the "West."
Modern Latin American countries are heirs to the sane Western legallraditions. But I do take as a
premise to this article the suggestion of many authors that the legal systems in many Latin American legal systems differ more substantially from the rule of law ideal than do the aforementioned
legal systems, especially in the respect tbat the judiciaries in many Latin American cOLlJ1tries have
less independence than in the aforementioned countries.

16. q: A.A. MILNE, THE HOUSE AT POOH CORNER 123-24 (1956) (in which Pooh, los! with
Piglet in the misty forest but repeatedly stumbling across a certain sandpit, suggests finding tbe
way home by deliberately wandering away from the pit and then trying to find it).
17. See, e.g., PRfLLAMAN, supra note 4, at 19 (failure of Latin American judiCiaries "to
achieve the delicate balance between judicial independence ancl judicial accoul1lability"); Stephen
B. Burbank. & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering .Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AT THE CROSSROADS 9, 12, 14-16 (Stephen B. Burbank & BaiTY Friedman eds., 2002) (completely independent courts would be intolerable; fatber, judicial independence and accountBbility
are different sides of same coin); cf. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS 34 (1981) (saying descriptively,
not normatively, that the U.S. debate over election of judges is "unresolvable because it involves
two conflicting goals: one, that [courts as] triadic conflict resolvers be independent; two, that
[courts as] lawmakers be responsible to the peopJe.")~ Tiede, supra note J, at 159-60 (noting ways
in which judicial independence is contrary to rule 0: law values).
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Section III opens the second line of inquiry, which explores the argument that a belief in the role of law to transform society characterizes the
Western cultures that support reasonable levels of judicial independence
and that such a belief creates a dynarrjc capable of countering the claims of
politics and building popular support for limiting executive power over
courts. The basic logic of the transformative law thesis is tbat the need to
create structural protections from executive overreaching with regarll to
such things as the recruitment, selection, pay, promotion, disciplining, and
dismissal of judges becomes obvious to a broad public in the case of law
that is expected to change society, because the executive is always an interested party in such legal disputes. This thesis is not offered as an exclusive
explanation for the development of greater degrees of judicial independence, but as a restatement or refinement of some of the chief alternative
theories and one that promises to be especially useful to reformers seeking
to increase cultural support for judicial independence in Latin America. 18 I
do not, however, claim that the adoption of transformative law leads
quickly or inexorably toward cultural reform. I only claim that strengthening popular belief in the transformative role of laW makes more likely a
concomitant growth in popular support for judicial independence and that
fostering that belief could therefore be a useful tool for judicial reform. 19
Section II! begins the argument for the transformative thesis with Lawrence Rosen's observations about traditional Islamic law,"o which appears
to have developed neither a transformative view of law nor structural protections for the independence of judges. The section then develops the contrary argument for the modern Western legal traditions of civil and common
law and builds on Martin Shapiro's model for the sociopolitical legitimacy
of courts 2l to explain how a transformative view of law might lead to the
development of substantial public support for giving judges structural protections for their independence. Again, the sharp contrast with modern
Western legal traditions permits us to appreciate more clearly ideals or values which are associated with a belief in transformative law. Section III
closes with a discussion of the role that the ideals of equal and impersonal
application of law play in a culture that supports transformative law and the

18. See ifljl'a text accompanying notes 82-84.

19. I suggest such strategies as ways of showing the relevance of the idea of transformative
Imv. But this article does not take a position as to whether the judges actually should have more or
less independence in any given country in Latin America. One important corollary of the argument in section II about the continuing tension between law and politics is that one cannot specify
an optimum }evel of judicial independence for all countries. One has to look at the specit1c siluation in each country individually. Accord Burbank & Friedman, supra note [7, at II, 16.
20. ROSEN, supra note 11, nt 64; LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE: LAW
AS CULTURE IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY 61 (1989) [hereinafter ROSEN, ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUS'rlCE].
21. SHAP!RO, sUpn! note 17, al 49-56; Mmtin Shapiro, Judicial Independence: The English
Experiel1cl:', S5 N,C. L. REV. S77, 620-21 ([977) lhereinafter Shapiro, Judicial Jlldepelldl!lIcej.
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basis for thinking that belief in transformative law and these associated values may be quite weak in at least some considerable parts of Latin America.
Since I have been unable to find a thorough multicountry history of the
development of institutional protections for judicial independence in modern Western legal systems, section IV offers brief historical sketches for the
United States, France, and Great Britain. The chief purpose of these
sketches is to argue the consistency of that hi story with both the claims
made in section II about the enduring importance of some degree of political influence or control over courts and the transformative law thesis of
section III. These three histories illustrate the continuing presence of at least
modest degrees of political influence within contemporary protections for
judicial independence, as well as the tendency of the executive power to
play the principal role in asserting political control, as section II argues
should be the case. The historical sketches also show a striking association
between the adoption of structural guarantees of judicial independence and
the adoption of constitutional review of legislation, an aspect of public law
that I argue inclndes important examples of what I mean by transformative
law. I therefore argue that the historical sketches provide some support for
the transformative law thesis.
By way of conclusion, section V snnmarizes the key values that the
two lines of inquiry have suggested are important in a culture that supports
transfonnative law. According to the transfonnative law thesis\ these values

should therefore be part of the culture that supports a reasonable level of
judicial independence. The section closes with some examples of strategies
for increasing the effectiveness of transformative law that already exists in
Latin American legal systems, especially law that seeks to address serious
inequalities. If the transformative law thesis has merit, such reforms would
appear to offer some of the best ways to mitigate cultures of personalism
and inequality that appear to stand in the way of developing a stronger
culture of judicial independence in Latin America.
II.

THE DEBATE [N ANCIENT CHINA BETWEEN LAW AND MORAUTY AND
THE CONT[NU[NG STRENGTH OF THE CLA[MS OF POUT[CS

A.

The Ancient Chinese Debate and Its Legal System

Ancient China witnessed an important debate that is of continuing relevance to all who are concerned with law today. The debate was between
Confucius and his followers, on the one hand, and a group 'of writers and
statesmen collectively known to history as the Fa Chia [the Fa Jia]?2 often
22. In general, this paper gives Chinese names and terms in the common Anglicized form,
like "Confucius," if there is one, and otherwise in the Wade-Giles system of transliteration, with
Lhe pinyin transliteration in brackets, if it is different. In some cases Wade-Giles is a bener guide
fa pronunciation for the nonspeciallst; in others, pinyin is better.
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translated as "Legalists," on the other.'3 Confucius and his followers argued
that the best way to govern a country was through education using moral
persuasion and example. Among the Legalists, those following Lord Shang
were staunch advocates of governing a nation through a system of thorough
and strict laws, backed up by generous rewards and severe punishments. 24
Confucianists led the side of the debate rejecting reliance on rewards
and punishments. Confucian thinkers believed that law (fa) was not nearly
as important as Ii, a concept which Confucius and his followers broadened
beyond its root meaning of "ritual" and "courtesy" to include "morality"
and "ethical behavior."25 Confucius himself is supposed to have said: "Lead
them by political maneuvers, restrain them with punishments [and] the people will become cunning and shameless. [But] [l]ead them by virtue, restrain them with ritual [and] they will develop a sense of shame and a sense
of participation."26 The chief point of Ii was, at least originally, to inculcate
in each person a respect for and an understanding of the importance of
maintaining the five essential relationships, four of which are hierarchical. 27
23. On the debate in general, see JOHN W. HEAD & YANPING WANG, LAW CODES IN DYNASC!:lINA 23-59 (200S) for a discussion with extensive citation to English and some Chinese
language scholarship. See also HERRLEE O. CREEL, WHAT IS TAOISM? 92-120 (1970) (more detailed analysis of the various authors who together comprise the Fa Chia); ARTHUR WALEY,
THREE WAYS OF THOUGHT IN ANCIENT CHINA 158-61 (1939) (.on the Legalists' conception of
law); id. at 191-96 (on Realism in action); A SOURCE BOOK IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 251-52
(Wing-Tsil Chan ed, & trans., 1963) (on the Legalists) [hereinafter SOURCE BOOK]'
It seems probable that only certain of the philosophers ancl statesmen conventionally regarded as part of the Legalist school actually advocated the use of law backed LIp by heavy criminal penalties while other Legalist thinkers were rJuch more concerned with how the Emperor
should rule by controlling the bureaucracy. CREEL, Hlpru, at 92-120 (arguing that a better translation of Fa Chio would be "Adminislrators" because; only Shang Yang (also known as Lord Yang)
and his followers should be known as '·Legalists" for their emphasis on the use of law; Shen Puhai founded another school that disapproved of the use of harsh criminal law but was primarily
concerned with administrative measures the Emperor should use to control the bureaucracy; Han
Fei Tzu combined the two schools in his writings, and it is his version that has tended to be
regarded as the Fa Chia as Shen's name came to be forgotten, but it is in fact Shen's ideas about
setting up and controlling the bureaucracy that have had the greatest impact on China); see also
WALEY, supra, at 152 (because the concern for law was only part of their program, Fa Chia
should be translated as '·Realists" or "Amoralists"). Part of the problem is thut the word "fa" in the
name of this philosophic movement is ambiguous. Il could mean '·law," but it could also mean
'·method," which fits in with Shen's emphasis on the technique of handling a bureaucracy. Ie!. at
93.
24. As indicated in the previolls footnote, the Fa Chi{1 probably did not constitute a unified
school of thought, but rather a loose collection of related thinkers. It is clear that Shang Yang and
his followers advocated reliance on the criminal laws, HEAD & WANG, supra note 23, at 63-70.
but it appears that other Legalists agreed with the Confucianists' ctiticism of relying on harsh
punishments. CREEL, supra note 23, at 103.
25. HEAD & WANG, supra note 23, at 17.
26. [d. at 39 (quoting THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS, Chapter 2, passage 2.3 (Simon Leys
trans .. 1997)).
27. The four unequal rel;llionships were ernperor-.'>Llbject. f:llher-son, older brother-younger
brother, and husband-wife. The only relationship Jf equality was the relationship between two
friends. [d. at 49. Li prescribes the appropriale behavior for each of these relationships. Thus '·the
ideal ruler is benevolent, the idea! subordinate is loyal; the ideal father is compassionate, the ideul
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The political theory behind Confucianism was that maintaining these relationships, including the social hierarchies immanent il1 these relationships,
was the way to maintain social harmony and a well-governed country. The
Legalist champions of law thought law a more powerful tool for maintaining social harmony, and they stressed that the law, induding its punishments, should apply to all persons equally, regardless of social rank and
relationship. The Confucianists were hOlTified by such an approach because
it uiolated their concept of li. n Confucian thought thus essentially called for
creating a good society through rule by good men who would know how, in
each situation, to maintain social harmony by treating each relationship
with another person according to the rules of Ii. Legalists rejected the Confucian political theory because they thought that moral inflnence could not
be powerful enough to guarantee social order. Instead of rule by good men
according to Ii, which called for different people to be treated differently,
they called for rule by laws that punished all equally.
It is important to understand that the morality at the heart of Confucianists' concept of Ii is political morality or political philosophy. Their
chief interest and the chief interest of their opponents in the debate over law
concerned the best way to govern a state. As Simon Leys has written,
The central importance of rites [Ii] in the Confucian order may at
first appear disconcerting to some Western readers (conjuring up
in their minds quaint images of smiling Oriental gentlemen, bowing endlessly to each otber), but the oddity is merely semantic;
one needs only to substitute for tbe word "rites" concepts such as
"moeurs\" "civilized usages," "moral conventions,)) or even
"common decency," and one immediately realizes that the Confucian values are remarkably close to the principles of political
philosophy which the Western world inherited from the Enlightenment. Montesquieu in particular. . developed notions which
unwittingly recouped Confucius's views that a government of
rites is to be preferred to a government of laws; Montesquieu considered that an increase in law-making activity was not a sign of
civilization-it indicated on the coetrary a breakdown of social
morality, and his famous statement, "Quand un people a de bonne

son is filial [demonstrates filial obedience, respect, love, and care for the father]; the ideal elder
brother is kind, the ideal younger brother respectful; the ideal husband is righteous, the ideal wife
submissive; the ideal friend is faithful." Id.
28. Some scholars argue that Confucim himself, whose own statements show that he offered
his instruction to members of all classes, thought that whoever distinguished himself in study
should be fit to advise rulers, and criticized class distinctions, would have rejected the way the
school of thought that bears his name came to represent support for and rationalization of the
class-based system of inequality that characterized dynastic China. ld. at 38, 40, 42-44, 58-59
(citing especially Simon Leys and Hen'lee G. Creel). Be that as it may, there appears to be no
dispute that those who took over Confucius's mantle-did uphold the class system in China and
support large inequalilies in the Jaws. ld. at 42-43, 58-59.
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moeurs, les lois deviennent simples" could have been lifted
straight from the Analects [of Confuciusj.29
The founder of the Ch'in [Qin] dynasty, Ch'in Shih [Shi] Huangti
[Huangdi], who reigned as the first emperor of a unified China from 221 to
210 B.C.E., gave Legalists leading roles in his government and attempted to
suppress Confucian thinking. He is even charged with killing many people
and burning many books in the process. Wing-Tsit Chan recounts the traditional ending to the story, emphasizing the shortness of the Legalists' reign:
"The brutality and violence of the Ch'in brought its early downfall in 206
B.C.E. and the Chinese, fearful of the ruthlessness of the Legalists, have
ever since that time rejected them."30 It would be wrong, however, to conclude that, starting with the Han dynasty, which replaced the Ch'in and
brought Confucianists back into government, China functioned essentially
without law. In fact, by that time, ancient China had a long tradition of
producing legal codes, to which the Legalists, With their interest in law, had
. been major contributors. The Han duly adopted their own legal code, which
appears to have drawn heavily on the Ch'in Code and other preceding Chinese law codes. Through a process tha: is called "Confucianization" of the
law, Legalist ideas about law, especially the utility of harsh criminal penalties and the importance of equal application of penalties, were slowly re,
placed by Confucian ideas favoring milder penalties and special provisions
for more lenient treatment of offenders from the higher classes.'l The real
outcome of the debate was not a simple victory for political morality in
China, but a compromise in which law and law codes continued to be important tools for governance throughout dynastic China. Confucian teaching, however, made political morality, backed up as needed by raw political
power, the preferred tool for governing the country.32
While law thus had continuing importance in dynastic China, it looked
very different from the concept of law we know in the West. Most importantly for our subject, dynastic China provided no protections to secure the
29. HEAD & WANG, S!/pra note 23, at 39-40 (quOling THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS
xxv-xxvi (Simon Leys trans., 1997»).
30. SOURCE BOOK, sllpra note 23, at 251. The story is told in much greater detail in HEAD &
WAND, supra note 23, at 6 [-104, For the debate us portrayed in a Han Dynasty document, tbe
Discourses on Salt (IIutlron (Yell-tie lUll), see MICHAEL LOEWE, FAITH, MYTH AND REASON IN
HAN CHINA 172-74 (1982) (qlioting parts of the Discourses).
31. HEAD & WANG, supra note 23, at 101 (during Han Dynasty tbe harshness of crimina!
penalties was considerably ameliorated and the beginnings of a system of more lenient punishments for higher ranked classes was recognized, which was to flower into much clearer legal
distinctions in favor of the higher classes in the codes of later dynasties, especially the Tang and
Ch'ing); see ol,<;o id. at 96-98 (describing how Confucianist thinking came to supplant Legalist
thinking in the interpretation of the law and, eventually, the drafting of legal codes); id. at
109-115 (describing further Confucianization of the law in tht: period between Han and Tang
Dynasties ('220 to 618 AD); Sl-L<\.P1RO, .wpm note 17. at 169 (describing Chinese law as a "mixture
of mediatory and legalistic elements" under dominant Confucian philosophy).
32. HEAD & WANG, supra note 13, nt 61-104 (again with extensive citntion to English and
some Chinese language scholarship).
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independence of those exercising judicial function. Dynastic China was a
polity that "consisted of a highly centralized government headed by an absolute ruler who ruled by means of a bureaucracy."" Because of reliance on
bureaucracy for governance, there was scarcely anything that could be
called a legal system. For example, Harold Berman has suggested that the
following features are chief characteristics of Western legal systems: a discrete body of legal professionals (lawyers and judges), to whom is entrusted
the administration of legal institutions, who tend to engage in legal activities to the exclusion of other forms of business activity, and who have a
special training in law in professional schools and their own professional
literature about the law. 34 China, by contrast, had little legal literature,"
hardly anyone who could be called a professional lawyer, no schools of
law,36 and not even a specialized body of judges. The judicial function was
fulfilled by the chief administratDr or "magistrate" in each district, who was
also chief prosecutor and chief tax collector fDr his district. The district
magistrate had no guarantees of independence. Quite the cDntrary, he served
at the pleasure Df the emperor (or whoever amDng the top bureaucrats or
eunuchs was actually in cDntrol) and the same was true of the higher level
bureaucrats who served in the various appeals boards. 37
The traditiDnal Chinese lack Df interest in securing the independence
of the judicial officer dDes not, however, result from the resolution Df the
33. TUE GREAT QINC CODE 6 (William C. Jones trans., 1994).
34. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 8 (1983).
35. "The role of law and jurisprudence has been far less prominent in China than in the
West," according to Creel, though, as one would expect from a group of advocates of an expanded
role for law, the Legalist followers of Lord Shang made a "considerable" contribution in the field
of jurisprudence. CREEL, supra note 23, at 113. But Legalist jurisprudence apparently had little
impact on the main body of Chinese thinking. !d.; see also THOMAS B. STEPHENS, ORDER AND
DISCIPLINE IN CHINA 11-12 (1992) (nothing in China like the traditions of jUlisconsuIts in Roman
law; no analogue in Chinese culture to the jurisprudential writings in the legaJ systems of the
We~t). There are some collections of case reports that have survived from as far back as the Sung
Dynasty and many more from the Ch'ing, HEAD & WANG, supra note 23, at 217-18, but as far as
works tbat concern speculative analysis of the law, I can find mention of only one book from the
Han Dynasty that discllssed the resolution of 232 hypothetical cases according to Confucian principles, There were also commentaries on the imperial codes, which had become quite common by
the Ch'ing Dynasly./d. a196, 207-11. But there is no indication that the commentaries attempted
to elaborate any system of principles underlying the specific code provisions or otherwise undertook to analyze or systematize the law in the manner of Western critical writing about law, though
most of the commentaries have not yet been translated into a Western language. Ie!.
36. There were people with a "superficial knowledge of the law and formalities, who offered
their services secretly," but they were often suppressed by the government ancl did not play an
important role in administration of the law, which was entirely in the hands of the bureaucra~y,
which in turn was trained in literahlre and Confucian philosophy, not law. Shuzo Shiga, Some
Remark.s on the Judicial System in China: Historical Development alld Characteristics, in TRADlTIONAL AND MODERN LEGAL INSTlTUTIONS IN ASlA AND AFRICA 44, 48 (David C. Buxbaum ed.,
1967).
37. HEAD & WANG, supra note 23, at 215-17 (for Ch'ing (Qing) Dynasty); accord Shiga,
supm note 36, at 46-51 ("[d]espite the rise and fall of many dynasties," there was no concept of
"an independent court"; district magistrate functioned as judge;- only at higher appeal levels were
there specialized judicial bodies, but none of the officials were trained specifically in law).
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debate over law and politics, Even if the Legalists had triumphed in the
debate, China would no doubt have still developed a strong reliance on a
bureaucratic mechanism for administering the law, for it was, after all, Legalist thinkers, albeit from a different branch of the Fa Chia than Lord
Shang, who developed the forms of bureaucratic governance that China was
to use for so many centuries 38 And there was no more of a basis in Legalist
thought than in Confucian thought for arguing that the judges needed to be
independent of the absolute mler's power. Lord Shang and his followers
were not champions of the mle of law, They, like everyone else in ancient
China, regarded law as a tool for securing obedience to the governing regime and its values, Like everyone else in the debate, when they spoke of
law, they meant mle by law,
E,

The Modem Relevance of the Chinese Deh,1te

It may seem strange to insist that the debate in ancient China is important to the understanding of the culture of judicial iudependence today, It
was not a debate about the rule of law, and the version of law that was at
stake in the debate was an extreme version that emphasized harsh criminal
penalties joined to a totalitarian administc'ative system, Moreover, the debatc resulted in preservation of the totalitarian administrative system with
milder criminal penalties administered in a system in which Confucian political morality, not law, was the privileged form of argument. But it was a
debate about law versus political morality, and therefore, I argue, in effect a
debate about law versus politics, It is thus a debate that is anterior to and
subsumed in all other debates about the mle of law,
The Chinese debate is ultimately a debate about the relationship between law and politics because political morality is at the heart of politics in
a way that law is not. There is at least a fOlmal division between law and
politics, but there is no meaningful distinction between political morality
and politics-especially in the case of a political morality as attuned to the
specific persons involved and their ranks and relationships as Confucian
thought required. The very claim that something is governed by law is a
claim that it is not governed solely by political or moral concerns while
political morality and political philosophy are inevitably at the center of
political discourse. The ancient debate in China thus raises an issue that
remains contested in all modern legal systems, the proper relationship between law and politics. Is it better, for example, to seek to change societal
behavior through law or through political action and persuasion? Can a system of law actually achieve any lasting changes in society without concomitant political changes? And if you think that a political mobilization in favor
38. See supra note 23 (discussing Herlee Creel's study of the contributions of the wing of Fil
Chin led by Shen Pu-Hai).
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of change is always necessary to create meaningful, lasting social changes,
then how important can law be?39
Attempts in the modern world to eliminate law as a governing force
show the continuing relevance of the Confucian side of the debate. Both the
Russian Communists and the Chinese COlT'munists, for example, ultimately
had to abandon their attempts to govern without law. But even if political
leaders grudgingly make room for courts and law in the governing structure, as the Russian Communists did starting with Lenin's New Economic
Policy and as the Chinese Communists did after the Cultural Revolution,
the view that the Confucianists had the right side of the ancient debate still
predominates in many corners of the world and provides a powerful, principled basis for arguing for political control over the courts. Political leaders
of all stripes tend to be convinced of the rightness of their causes. Law is
easily seen as an obstacle to politics, especially the politics of change, because important aspects of law tend to reflect and protect the status quo. It
is understandable that political leaders and their most ardent supporters may
believe in the primacy of politics over law. It is easy to slip from that position to one that denigrates law as an obstacle to political leadership and
independent courts as a suspect fragmentation of the pOlitical power necessary to rule effectively. So we see many examples of powerful political
leaders from both the Right and the Left seeking to weaken or eliminate the
independence of the courts in favor of political leadership.40
The ancient Chinese debate is thus relevant for helping us see how
problematic it would be to view judicial independence as an absolute value,
even in the Western legal tradition. The ancient debate was not resolved by
a complete victory for either side, nor should either side win today. We
glibly say that judicial independence is at the heart of the iCieal of the rule of
law,41 and yet we cannot mean to deny entirely a role for political influence
39. Cj Mark Tushnet, Living with a Em of Rights, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 17
(Collor Gem1y & Adam Tomkins eds., 1996) (arguing against judicial review of legislation, in
part, on the grounds that "if you can pass a bill of nghts that places substantial restrictions on
police activity, why could you not have passed a statute that placed exactly those same restrictions
on police activity?").
40. See, e.g., PAUL LEWIS, AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES IN LATlN AMERICA 204 (2006) (Marxist
Allende's attacks on the court in Chile); MARC LINDER, THE SUPREME LABOR COURT IN NAZI
GERMANY: A JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS 15-31 (1987) (Nazi pressure on courts, which however
never resulted in any dismissal or formal disciplining of a judge); PRILLAMAN, supra note 4, at
113 ("[FJew democratically elected civilian leaders in Latin America in modern times did more to
subordinate the judiciary to political influence [than Menem in Argentina]."), 139-40 (Allende
undermined courts, but Pinochet did far more damage without intervening directly in internal and
administrative autonomy of courts); Castaldi, supra note 10 (removals of judges by Chavez re~
gime in Venezuela go beyond reasonable campaign against judicial corruption and constitute campaign to intimidate court); Derek Matyszak, Crearing a Compliant Judiciary ill Zimbabwe, 20002003, in ApPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDIC1AL POWER 331 (Kate Malleson & Peter H.
Russell eds., 2006); Rosenn, supra. note J 0, at 24 (Cuba formally abrogated judicial independence
after Castro_revolution, subordinating courts to executive),
41. See supra text accompanying note I.
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over the judges. The historical sketcbes in section IV suggest that even
among the Western countries where the rule of law ideology originated,
political influence over judges has continued to be important. This is clearest in view of the admittedly political methods of judicial selection in the
United States, but also in the long time that it took for France and Great
Britain to adopt any structural protections for their judiciaries. Indeed, the
persistence of political influeuce over the judiciary in these countries makes
sense because all of them are, after all, well-consolidated democracies with
competitive elections. While democracies may vary significantly with respect to the degree to which they accept law as a limitation on the power of
the elected branches of government, none of them can deny the importance
of politics. Democracy today generally means giving great importance to
competitive electoral politics. Rule of law ideology has to accept that
judges have some degree of political responsibility and are subject to some
degree of political influence if the judicial system is to be compatible with
democracy. When the rule of law calls for judicial independence, it thus
should not call for absolute independence, but rather for some reasonable
balance between independence and political responsibility 42 Since this is
not a paper on institutional design, my only point here is that any design of
the office of the judge that completely eliminates either side of the balance
between independence and political influence is problematic. I do not advocate great political control over judges, but I do suggest that rule of law
advocates have to be willing to accept some modest measures of political
influence that do not completely undermine the claim that the judges are
free to decide each case before them according to the law ane! not according
to politics. 43
The ancient Chinese debate also underlines the importance, for the
concept of law as we understand the term in the West, of equal treatment
and a certain ability and willingness to treat individuals in an abstract or
impersonal manner that ignores family and clan relationships or personal
rank or status. While the Legalists' program "shared the Confucian concept
that ranks and duties must be clearly differentiated, it insisted that laws
must be applicable to all,"44 and this insistence conflicted seriously with the
dominant Confucian ideology, which was based on respect for family, relationship, and rank. Not all ideologies :hat privilege politics over law are
necessarily based on respecting social inequalities. Many in fact profess
egalitarian ideologies. Certainly that is the case with communism. And it
must be conceded that systems that rely on law can just as easily enforce
42. See authorities cited SIIpra \1ote 17.
43, For additional discussion of the limits within which the appropriate balance has to be
found, ~ee injra note 169.
44. SOURCB BOOK, slIpm note 23, at 252; see also HEAD & WANG, supra note 23, at 50;
WALEY, slIpm note 23, at 170 (Legalists' program was to eliminate hereditary privileges and grant
preferment only for distinction in war).
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social inequalities, But the Legalists appear to have formulated a claim that
would resonate with modern Western legal systems, the notion that law
should apply equally to all people, without regard to who they are or what
political or social clout they may have, Without trying to turn the idea of
law into a full-blown constitutional principle of equal treatment, it seems
fair to say that the notion of law held by the Legalists, like that underlying
modern Western law, is associated with a belief in some kind of minimal
level of equality that has to do with equal and impersonal application of the
law,,\5 We will recur to these points in section III's discussion of Islamic
law. which will provide further insight into the role that equal treatment and
impersonal or abstract treatment of people play in modern Western legal
systems,
At this stage in the argument, it is important to see the way these values are related to both strengths and weaknesses of systems of political
morality, Such systems are freer to ignore issues of equality, The Confucianists preferred morality to law precisely because it allows a thoroughly
person-specific kind of reasoning. To them, this was more "human" than
relying solely on a legal rule to be applied rigidly to all situations that can
be subsumed uncler its terms because it allowed them to take into consideration the full personal situation, including family, rank, and status, of each
human being,46 But an official making decisions based primarily on political morality, not on law, has an enormous 3lnount of discretion. That fact is
not troublesome if you have great confidence in the people making the deci45. Cj David M. Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise a.fCapitalism, 1972 W1S. L.

REV.

no, 727 (1972) (describing the notion of "legal ratio:1aJity," a cOllcept which Weber thought most
strongly exemplified by continental European legal systems, as "the degree 10 which a legal sys~
1em is capable of formulating, promulgating, and applying universal rules"). Weber classified
traditional Chinese law as a form of "substantive irntionalily" because it involved "judging persons according to their concrete qualities and in terms of the concrete situation, or according to
equity and the appropriateness of the concrete result." ld. at 733 n.22 and accompanying text.
CurioLlsly, he referred to this aspecl of Chinese law as "Kadi-juslice," referring to the qadi or
judge-figure of traditional Islamic law. See infra section III(A). For a discussion of how Westerners, including Weber, have mischaracterized the law-finding process in Islamic courts, see
ROSEN, ANTHROPOLOGY Of' JUSTICE, supm note 20, at 58-79, nnd for a summary of the way in
which qadi couns find law, see infra section HI(D). The discussion there of the personalism of
Lraditional hilamic law will reveal a legal system in which equal application of the law held a
rather different meaning than it does in Western legal :;yslems.
46. Creel says that Confucian-clominated Chinese :;ociety (speaking generally of dynastic
Chinese society and specifically of Ch 'jng rQing] era China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) was a "much more 'human' society than ours." RG. CREEL, CHINESE THOUGHT FROM CONFUCIUS TO MAO TSE-TuNG 240 (l953). By contrast, he wrote that we in the West
tend to dehumanize people, make them cogs in machines, move them about like pieces
on a checkerboard. If they perform their jobs to the satisfaction of their superiors, well
and good; if not, they are discharged. In China a whole series of relationships had to be
taken into account, including customary rights and privileges. If the law of the Jand and
the customs of a guild came into conflict, the courts woulcl sometimes rule in favor of
the guild. Even the prices of commodities were negotiated in each instance between
buyer and seller, so that a man with a winning personality ancl the gift of bargaining
could buy much more cheaply than a Jess talenteJ;t competitor.
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sions, and in Confucian theory, the officials should all have been educated
and examined thoroughly on the Confucian classics and therefore morally
"superior" men. But their qualifications notwithstanding, a system that
gives priority to governance by politics is inevitably a system of rule by
men. Unlike a system that relies primarily on politics, a system based on
law tends toward the articulation of a set of rules that purport to cabin the
discretion of the decision maker precisely because they use objectively defined categories. Law's use of a technical, impersonal method may suit it
better to limiting arbitrary decisions by government officials than political
morality 4? Certainly the arguments to counter contemporary movements
that preach reliance on political control and persuasion rather than on law
have to be based in large measure on this argument.
A final point of the Chinese debate's relevance for modern legal systems has to do with the nature of the chief threat to judicial independence.
Because a system of judicial independence has to make room for some aspects of political responsibility and int1uence in a modern democracy, it is
the political leadership in the other two hranches-the "political"
branches-who can be expected to pose a continual threat to judicial independence. Moreover, as between the legislative and executive branches, today it is the executive that is better suited to serve as a main vehicle for
political oversight of the courts. Both the legislature am! the executive are
chosen in political processes that make them suitable representatives of major political forces, but the executive, usually a single-headed," hierarchical
body with a large staff, is better organized to supervise others and to project
political leadership than the legislature, which is a collective body with a
large membership and a relatively small staff49 Small wonder, therefore,
that, as the history canvassed in section IV will show, at least since the
development of the modern executive branch in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, political oversight over judges has tended to come in its
most threatening form from the executive branch. The long-term tendency
for the executive branch to dominate :he courts is the function of both the
tension at the heart of the rule of law between law and politics and the very
different institutional structure of the two "political" branches.
47. In his brilliant and critical portrait of Ming Dynasty government, Ray Huang illustrates
this point repeatedly. See, e.g., RAY HUANG, 1587, A YEAR OF No SIGNIFICANCE: THE M[NG
DYNASTY IN DECLINE 143, 149,210 (1981). A modern Chinese writer seems to echo this idea
when he writes, "A society needs courts precisely because courts can tllm the solving of complicated problems into a technical, institutionalized, and legalized procedure, and thus muinmin the
stability and uniformity of the legal system." Xin Chul1ying, Whm Kind ofJlldicia/ PVH'er Does
China Need?, 1 INT'L 1. CONST. L 58, 71 (2003).
48. There are some multiheaded execlltiw branches, as in Switzerland, but these are not
commoo. MATTHEW SOBERO SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDE~TS AND ASSEMBl.lES: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS 78, 96-101(199'1).
49. For an elegant discussion of this point, see Charles L Black, Jr., The Working Balance of
the American Political Deportllll!nts. I HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13 U 97+),
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TRANSFORMATIVE LAW, ESPeCIALLY PUBLIC LAW, AND ITS

POTENTIAL TO GENERATE SUPPORT FOR REASONABLE LEVELS
OF JUDICIAL IN:JEPENDENCE

If the executive branch in a modern democracy is the chief counterweight and threat to judicial independence, then in order to foster the culture that favors reasonable levels of judicial independence, we need to find
a political dynamic that would create support for the adoption of substantial
institutional protections for the judges, limiting the executive's ability to
control or influence the judiciary unreasonabJy, I advance the. transformative law thesis because I think it does precisely that. Before explaining that
thesis, it will be helpful to be clear about what I mean by "transfonnative
law,"
Much law is intended to enforce the status quo, but transformative law
is intended to change society. Contemporary examples from U.S. law include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in the job market on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national
origin,5o or the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits discrimination against the disabled in employment, but also in public services, accommodations, and telecommunications 51 In both cases, supporters of the
legislation had no doubts that there was discrimination against the class of
people they intended to heJp. The Jaw was not passed to confirm social
practice but to provide a legal basis for enforcement action designed to
change social behavior. Of course, the hope always is that the mere enactment of the law, or at least the threat of enforcement, will be sufficient to
secure widespread voluntary compliance, but the point is that transformalive law is adopted for the purpose of effectuating societal change.
A.

Traditional Islamic Law

My basis for thinking that the concept of transformative law might be
connected with judicial independence starts with an intriguing observation
by Lawrence Roseu about traditional Islamic law. 51 I am interested in Is50. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2005).
51. Americans with Di.-;abilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2005),
52. I follow the scholars cited in this paper in refelTing to "Islamic law" or "traditional Islamic law" as the legal tradition based on Islam (the sh(/tio) which was produced by Muslim
jUlists in Muslim lands during the peliocls of rule by Muslim rulers and largely formed before the
time of European colonization, which started chiefly in the nineteenth century, except in India,
where it started earlier. That tradition spans a huge geographic area-from Morocco in the West
to Indonesia in the East, and up into central Asia and down into Africa at least as far as Nigeria
and Tanzania-and long timelines-from the time5 of the Prophet in the seventh century AD until
now. The sharia itself bas also been marked by the major diVision between Sunni and Shia, and
each of those tl'aclitions has for some centuries been divided into at least fOlif main schools. See H.
PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 179-83 (2000).
Generalizations about such a varied tradition might reasonably be held suspect. It might seem
especially problematic to base generalizations about traditional Islamic law on practices of present
day shari a courts in view of the pervasive contact between Muslim countries and modern Western
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lamic law as another sophisticated, non-Western legal tradition that did not,
in general, develop any structural or institutional protections for the independence of their judge-figure, the qadi,53 Professor Rosen's description of
how Islamic law has been applied in the qadi courts 54 of Morocco suggests
legal traditions since at least the nineteenth century, and arguably much earlier. Nevertheless,
scholars have noted great commonalities within the Islamic legal tradition, especially on systemic
matters like the roles of lawyer and scholar, methods of legal interpretation, methods of evaluating
proof, and so fOrlh. See ROSEN, ANTHROPOLOGY Of' JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 6 (arguing that the
court in Sefrou, Morocco, was, at the time he observed it, typical in many essential ways of
Islamic courts generally), For an extended but cautious argument that there are substantial continuities and common features in the various forms of Islamic law, and indeed of all the legal
traditions that mb shoulders in the Middle East, see Chibli MaHat, From is[((mic to Middle Eastern Law: A Restatement oj the Field (pts. 1 & 2), 51 AM. J. COMPo L. 699 (2003), 52 AM. 1. COMPo
L. 209 (2004),
53. In traditional Islamic law, the caliph or sultan generally appointed the qadi, who was
considered his agent and served at his pleasure. DAVID F. FORTE, STUDIES IN ISLAMIC LAW:
CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ApPLICATION 20 (1999); MaHat, supra note 52, 52 AM. J. COMPo
L. at 210. The ruler's arbitrariness was somewhat limited, at least in the Morocco studied by
Rosen, by the fact that he generally could not appoint someone as judge unless he had qualifled
through study in a mosque-university taught by learned scholars (m~ifti), and the status of the
scholars and the judges they trained as special guardians of the holy law undoubtedly gave them
some sense of autonomy. See ROSEN, ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 65. But the
traditional system, even though it did develop a I:;ophisticated doctrine of sources of law and
extensive written legal scholarship on all aspects of the shari a, never developed any institutional
protections for the legal offices of judge ur legal schular.
Rosen tells a story from Morocco that illustrates the very limited autonomy traditionallegaJ
officials could expect: The Sultan's local administrator tried to force the local qadi to register land
the administrator had coerced from local owners, contrary to the sharia. The qadi resisted and fled
just as the administrator was about to seize him. The enraged administrator seized the local religious scholars and threw them in jail instead. The new qadi registered the land. But locally important figures refused to recognize the new qadi, sent a delegation to the Sultan, and persuaded him
to remove the administrator to the Sultan's camp for a period of "enforced rethinking." Id. at 62.
Traditionally, there was also no body of prcfessionallawyers to represent the parties in litigation. Mallat, supra note 52, 52 AM, J, COMP, L. at 210.
The situation was not much changed by colonial occupation by France and the subsequent
development of a Moroccan state after liberation. The qadis observed by Rosen were, like French
judges prior to 1958, see infra section IV(B), "wholly dependent on the administrative hierarchy
for advancement and placement," though Rosen did not think that the executive powers in fact
exercised their power to control the qadis. ROSEN, ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE, supra note 20, at
63.
I am grateful to Kim Lane Scheppele for reminding me that the Islamic law scholar, the
nwjh, who might not only teach the future qadi at the mosque-universities where Islamic law was
studied, but upon whose legal opinions the qadi might rely in deciding specific cases, had consid~
erably more autonomy. Like the Roman jurisconslllts, Islamic Jaw scholars held their offices primarily by virtue of the recognition they earned from other scholars for their mastery of the law.
Neither caliph nor sultan could control that process. As in Roman Jaw, it was the opinion of these
scholars, not of the qadi, that cOllnted in determining what the law was on any given point. See,
e.g., GLENN, supra note 52, at 165. The Islamic legal system thus had more autonomy from
political power than might appear from the statement abollt the lack of protections for the qadi.
Bllt see iJ!fm note 97 (arguing that this kind of@lonomy is not sufficient for transformative- law).
54. The qadi courts Rosen observed were specialized chambers for family law and property
cases for which the comt itself drew up the documents. The courts were \vithin a unified court
system, so the qadis had to be competent to sit ill criminal or civil chambers. ROSEN, ANTHROPOL·
OGY OF JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 10. But they 01.150 had been educated at the mosque-universities
in sharia. hi. at 65.
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to me that he sees Islamic law as lacking a concept of law as transformative
in general, and in particular, as lacking a view that law is the proper tool to
attempt to rectify society's inequalities. For example, he has wlitten that
"Islamic law thus seeks neither to equalize whatever inequality exists nor to
offer a preferred terrain for the reconstruction of society through judicial
legislation."" Similarly, he has said, referring to Islamic law, "Nor does the
law attempt, through a concept like the public interest, to offer itself as a
preferred vehicle for the reconstruction of society."56 One might object that
all law, to the extent it penalizes or imposes costs on human behavior in any
manner, seeks to change behavior. For example, Islamic law establishes
punishments that by modern standards seem quite harsh for six specific
types of actions, the In/dud crimes, but these are actions which are condemned by the QUI" an itself and they therefore have long been taken by
Muslim society to establish the outer bounds of behavior which is and must
be proscribed. Enforcement of these rules may change the behavior of some
social deviants, but society itself is not changed. Islam may have originally
been intended to make some major changes in society, especially in the
direction of increasing equality, and law, which lies at the heart of Islam,
may have at times been meant to playa role in effectuating such changes.
But over much of its history, and by the time Rosen observed it in qadi
courts in Morocco in the latter part of the twentieth century, Islamic law
apparently did not have, at least not to any great degree if I correctly understand Rosen's observations, a view that making changes in law is a good
way to transform society. 57
This is a large generalization about a complex legal tradition of huge
temporal and geographic dimensions, and we have been warned by recent
scholars who come out of that tradition to be careful about sweeping generalizations about Islamic law, especially if they are based on a notion of the
legal exceptionalism of Islamic law. In other words, we have been warned
not to fall into the orientalist trap of treating Islamic law as if it were some55. Id. at 79.
56. !d. al 57.
57. The six hudud crimes are adultery, non-conventional sexual practices, slander, lbeft,
highway robbery, and apostasy. The Qur'an establishes the punishment for these crimes, chiefly
by a set number of lashes or by stoning. AHMED E. SOLTAIAlA, CONTESTING JUSTICE: WOMEN,
ISLAM, LAW, AND SOCIETY

37-38 (2008).

Islam was meant in iLs original forl11 to change society. Huston Smith asks "whether history

has ever witnessed a comparable moral advance among so many people in so short a time."
HUSTON SMITI~, THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 248 (991). For example, the sharia's limitation on
polygyny to four wives at anyone time could be understood as an attempt to protect women from
the abuses of unlimited polygyny, especially in light of the injunction to "deal justly" with each
one. ld. at 252-53; SOUAlAiA, supra, at 51-52. I do not understand Rosen's observation to be an
argument that Islamic law is incapable of embracing transformative law, only that it came to be
incorporated largely in forms that did not include the concept. For an extended argument that
Islamic law is open to reinterpretation in ways..thatwoulcl permit it to ameliorate women's status
in Muslim societies, see id.
-
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thing exotic and categorically different from other forms of law." Nevertheless, we have sound reasons to credit observations by Rosen, trained as
an anthropologist and lawyer, about the practice of Islamic law in Morocco
in the late twentieth century where he spent "many months stretching over
nearly two decades"s9 observing the qadi courts and speaking with partici··
pants. One instance of the lund of legal system Rosen describes is sufficient
for my purposes, for I am more interested in Rosen's observations for the
light they shed by reflection on Western legal traditions, than what they
mean for Islamic law, so I will leave it to more qualified scholars to debate
the validity of Rosen's observation with respect to the whole of the Islamic
legal tradition.
In one respect, Rosen's statements are probably narrower than they
might appear. I take Rosen's observations to be statements about the law
that was being applied in the qadi courts whose jurisdiction was limited to
family law and property for which the court had drawn up the relevant
documents. 6o These are matters that were primarily covered by sharia, the
religiously based law that forms the core of what is usually meant by "Islamic law,"61 and did not involve the law that had long been applied outside
of the sharia, in special courts instituted by caliphs and sultans. 62 It is diffi·
cult to find, at least in the West, studies of these other sources of law, and
so it is not clear whether they also lacked transformative law, and I do not
therefore assert that they did not. However, prior to the twentieth century,
Islamic countries did not have representative legislatures with power to en58. Khaled Aboll EI Fadl, Soul Searching and the Spirit of Shari 'a: A Review of Bernard
Weiss's The Spirit of Isiomic L£lH', I WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 553 (2002).
59. ROSEN, ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUST!CE, supra Bole 20, at 5.
60. Id. at 10.
61. While shari a is not codified law, as sllch, il should be noted that in Morocco, the family
law was codified in 1957 and 1958 in the Law of Personal Status or Mudm-vwww, which was
based primarily on the Maliki school of shuria. There were some legislative reforms to that law
over the years, but the most sweeping were in 2004. Yakare-Oule Jansen, Muslim Brides alld the
Ghost of the Shari'a: Have the Recent Lull' Re/lJrJns in Egypt, TUllisia and Morocco Improved
Women's Position ill Marriage and Divorce, and Can Religious Moderates Bring Reform and
M(llce It Stick?, 5 Nw, U, 1. INT'L HUM. RTS. 181,202 (2007); see also Laura A. Weingartner,
Comment, Family Law & Reform ill Morocco-The Mudmllan(l: j\llodemist Islwil and Women's
Rights in the Code oj Personal StOWS, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 687, 692-97 (2005) (detailing
the differences between sharia and the Mudawwana prior to the 200--1- reforms). That major reform
was well after the publication of the books by Rosen on which I rely, so I think it is safe to say
that the law applied by the courts he observed was essentially the Maliki school of sharia.
62. FORTE, supra note 53, at 22-23 (describing tbe lIIa::.alim courts as a kind of equity jurisdiction beyond that of the sharia courts and rulers' "legislalion" as si)'asa which could be contrary
to shuria); BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 186-87 (1998) (penal law, tax law,
and law of war all fashioned by Islamic governments withoUL necessarily complying with shari a;
law articulated in volumes ofJiqh (juristic writing Lbout sharia) and collections of fatwas (decisions of jurists or councils of jurists in specific cases) counted as the "true" law of Muslim society;
mazalim courts not bound by tlqh). But see Aboll El Fadl, supra note 58, at 563 (warning against
the view, commonly expressed in Western literature about Islamic law, that Islamic law was "jurists' law," studied and debated for theoretical or' religiolls reasons and not so much for its
practicali ty).
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act law, and many still do not. As I will argue below in section lIJ(B), while
the Western legal traditions began developing the concept of transformative
law before it adopted democratic legislatures, that kind of body is nevertheless a key component of the modern Western culture that promotes a belief
in rronsformative law. It would not therefore be surprising if a society without such a body also failed to develop a very strong belief in changing
society through law'"' In fact, within the realm of Islamic law, the whole
notion of legal change has undoubtedly been constricted, at least within
Sunni Islam, where it has long been arguable, though not without controversy, that no further development of sharia is possible. 64

B.

The Contrast 'rith Western Law

By contrast to traditional Islamic law, the Western legal traditions of
civil and common law have both clearly embraced the concept of transformative law and, as section IV will illustrate, also developed significant
institutional protections for judicial independence. U.S. law, for example, is
full of laws intended to change society, from the aforementioned Title VII
and the ADA and other statutes that authorize victims or whistleblowers to
sue as "private attorneys general"65 to the whole mass of explicitly regulatory law.
63. I also argue iT~fra in ,;ection llI(B) that public law includes much lf3l1sformative law in
tbe West. The degree to which Islamic law included public law appears disputed. Many Western
writers state tbelt Islamic law had lillie public law, see, e.g., GLENN, supm nofe 52, at 193, but
Abou El Fadl trikes Western scholarship to ta.'lk for implying that Islamic law had liltle and therefore was a pril11itive legal system. Aboll EI Fadl, supra note 58, at 564. In fact there is much
agreement that Islamic law did include material on penal law, tax law, and even administrative
law. See, e.g., id.; Mallat, supra note 52, 52 AM. 1. CaMP. L. at 223~33 (records for court in
Tripoli from late seventeenth century include some criminal and administrative cases, in addition
to private law cases, but no constitutional cases); WEISS, supra note 62, at 186-87. Pending clarification of the nature of tbe public law involved in ,;haria, one cannot point (0 a lack of public law
to support the claim. that Islamic law lacked a concept of law's transformalive role.
64. Since the thilteenth centw)', many autborities within the Sunni schools of law have said
that the "gates of tjtihad [legal reasoning] have been closed," a phrase which was understood to
mean thut human jurists were no longer free to develop God's Jaw through human reason, Even in
the Sunni schools, not everyone agrees, and certainly not in the Shia schools of law, which have
never kno\\'n the closing off of ijtihad, FORTE, supra note 53, at 17,22-23; GLENN, supra note 52,
at 178-87. Nevertheless, the contemporalY Islamic law scholar Ahmed Souaiaia argues, as a broad
generalization about the Islamic legal tradition to date, that jU!ltice "was defined during, and did
not evolve beyond, the formative period of Islamic law and practices (the first two Islamic centu~
des)." Unlike the Western view, in which justice is free to evolve as society changes, "[t]he
Islamic religious concept of justice is locked." SOUI\IAIA, supra note 57, at 2. Such a view of legal
change is certainly inconsistent with the concept of transformative law and provides further corroboration that tram;fonnative law did not playa large role in traditional Islamic law.
65. Statutes that harness the energy and self-:nterest of private parties as "private attorneys
general" generally do so for the purpose of enhancing enforcement of transformative law. They
typically provide for some financial incentive to sue, like the treble damage awards in antitrust
suits under the Sherman Act, or the shifting of the successful plaintiff's attorneys fees to the
defendant, contrary to the usual U.S. rule that each side bears its own costs of counsel. For example, in NervlI1an v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S, 400, 401-02 (1968), a ca:ie brought by a
prh'ate plaintiff against a private restaurant owner under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
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The trans formative view of law is basic to Western European legal
systems, as well. Harold Berman has argued that each of the six great revolutions which he claims mark the development of Western law-the Papal
Revolution of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Protestant Reforma-tion, and the English, American, French, and Russian Revolutions-have
involved an initial
interim period in which new laws, decrees, regulations, and orders were enacted in rapid succession and as rapidly amended,
repealed, or replaced, Eventually, however, each of the great revolutions made its peace with the pre-revolutionary law and restored many of its elements by including them in a new system
that reflected the major goals, values, and beliefs for which the
revolution had been fought. Thus the new systems of law established by the great revolutions transformed the legal tradition
while remaining within it. 66
The great codification movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
furnish clear examples of this kind of legislation adopted with the intention
of changing societal relations after the revolutions of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries 67 By that time, developing ideas of democracy in
Western Europe included the idea of a representative legislature enacting
laws, Once that idea is established, the process of enacting laws to change
society seems to take on greater life, perhaps because the legislature, especially a democratically elected one, understands that it is called upon to

which forbids racial discrimination in public accommodations, the U.S. Supreme Court stated,
"[A] Title II suit is thus private in form only. Whe:1 a plaintiff brings an action. , . he cannot
recover damage::;, If he obtains an injunction. he does so not for himself alone but also as a
'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority."
The Court said that Title II provided for the shifting of the successful plaintiff's attorney's fees to
the defendant "to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief." Id.
at 402.
The Civil Rights Attorney':; Fees Award Act of [976,42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000), partially
codifies the idea of the private attorney general by providing a statutory basis for recovery of
attorney's fees by plaintiffs who successfully sue state and local governments. The Senate Report
accompanying this legislation stated that the intent was to level the playing field so lllat even
private citizens witb little money could serve as "private attorneys general" to bring these actions
to enforce the civil rights laws, S. Rep. No. 94-101 [, at 6 ([976).
66.

BERMAN,

supra note 34, at 29.

67. Consider, for example, the way in wbich the nineteenth-century codes reformed lhe dvil
law in order to eliminate feudal society and promote business tlnd bourgeois society. Sa, e.g.,
KONRAD ZWElGERT & HElN KaTZ, II\'TRODUCTION TO COMPARATlVE LAW: THE FRAMEWORK I
82-85 (Tony Weir trans., Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1987) (French codification). Shapiro nicely
captures this idea in summarizing the views of Jeremy Bentham, the chief English legal philosopher ,Issocialed with the nineteenth century codification movement: '"Law was not a set of external
principles or hallowed rights. It was an instrument that, through the assignment of pleasures and
pains, would move people to engage in socially de~irable activity," Shapiro, ludicict! Ilidepell~
dellce, supra note 21, at 627. See genemlly GLENN, Sl/pm note 52, at 135-43 (on the philosophic
and social contexts of the ever increasing receptivity in the Western legal traditions (0 changc).
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react to perceived problems,"" But even before the development of legislatures, Western law revealed its tendency to use law to transform society,
According to Berman, the Papal Revolution led to a process of reform in
which the law in Western Europe was infused with Christian doctrine,"9 and
the First Protestant or Lutheran Revolution in Germany taught that the ruling princes had the responsibility to promulgate positive law to ensure
righteons conduct and the common wea!.'o
The concept of revolutionary law highlights some difficulties with the
terminology of "transformative law," The ancient Chinese debate already
raised the question whether law can ever be used to change society if society is not already willing to change, I doubt that we shall ever have a definitive answer to that question, but it is clear that law is a possible lever of
power for those seeking to change a society, For purposes of the transformalive law thesis, I think it is only important that a substantial body of the
public think that a given law could be an important tool for changing society, Perhaps more critical for the transformativc law thesis is the problem of
distinguishing transformative and nontransformative law, Strictly speaking,
the incorporation of new values into law after society has adopted them is
not really an illustration of transformative law, Law is transfonnative only
when the enforcement of the law or the threat of enforcement has the power
to change society because a substantial segment of society has not yet
adopted the values of the law, Rut in the real world, it may often be difficult
to distinguish these two cases, It is generally not clear when the revolution
is over, but it usually has started before revolutionary law is adopted by
statutes or court decisions,
It is relatively clear, I think, that the decision in Brown v, Board of
Education,7l for example, can be regarded as trans formative law because
there were many public schools and other facilities throughout the American South set up under the principle of "separate but equal," which that case
invalidated, But before that decision could be rendered by the Supreme
Court, there was a substantial body of opinion, not only among humanrights activists, but also among American political and governmental leaders involved with U,S, foreign relations and military operations during the
68. Cf, Shapiro, Judicial Independence, supra note 21, at 627 (in the nineteenth century the
British Parliament reorganized itself to be capable of passing substantial new legislation, ancl the
combination of the "Bcnthamite urge to create a new and rational body of law and the parliamentary capacity to do so led to an enormous body of law reform").
69.

BBRMAN,

supm note 34 passim.

70. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II 6-7 (2003). Examples of trans formative
law are mOlit obvious with respect to spiritual matters, such as church liturgy, marriage, schooling,
moral discipline, and poor relief, each of which was regulated by ordinances promulgated by
secular authority in Protestant German lands during the sixteenth century with a mixture of radical
change and elements of continuity. ld. at 179-92.

71. 347 U,S, 483 (1954),
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cold war that American law had to change on that point. 72 In the case of
Title VII, it seems clear that activists for racial equality pushed for adoption
of a statute in order to provide a legal basis to challenge what they saw as
discrimination against racial minorities in the workplace. 73 In the case of
some other legislation, it may be much less clear whether the law is adopted
to change society or merely to codify exi,ting practices, and some types of
law, such as basic criminal and tort law concerning murder, probably reflect
long-standing societal consensus in generaL 7 " However, even though there
may be a number of' unclear boundary cases, [ believe there are enough
clear examples of transformative law in the modern Western legal tradition
to make the category useful.
In fact, I would argue that much of public law is transformative law.
Certainly much of constitutional and administrative law qualifies. Written
constitutions are generally adopted to establish a new order, rarely just to
confirm an already existing political order. They often call into being-that
is, they "constitute"-new political and legal bodies. Perhaps the catalogues
of human rights often included in constitutional documents are not always
meant to be transformative, but they may become transformative as a result
of specific interpretations they are given by the courts. As a result, we come
to view constitutions as potential sources of transformative law, and the
transformative parts of constitutional law are obviously hugely important.
Rules of administrative law are transformative in that they establish new
administrative agencies, regulatory powers, and proceedings or procedural
rules that did not exist before. Substantive regulatory statutes and administrative regulations are among the clearest types of transformative law because they typically impose new standards of behavior on the regulated
parties.
While it may be correct that much of transformative law is public law,
it would be incorrect to assume that private law cannot be. Legislative modification of private law rules is most clearly regulatory and hence transform72.

L.

DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DE-

(200 1);

THOMAS BORSTELMANN, THE COLD WAR AND THE COLOR LINE: AMERICAN

MARY

MOCRACY

RACE RELATIONS IN THE GLOBAL ARENA

(2001).

73. Francis 1. Vaas, Title Vll: Legisicltil'e Histor.v, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 432
(1966). Title VU's inclusion of sex as a prohibited ground of discrimination provides an example
of a legal rule that was passed even though it may not, by itself, have been supported by a legislative majority. It is clear that the amendment to add sex as a proscribed ground of discrimination
was sponsored by an opponent of the bill's provisions on racial discrimination. Id. at 441-42.
Perhaps he hoped by his amendmenl to scuttle the whole project. He was, in Hny event, unsuccessfuL The amendment was adopted in the House with liltie debate and also provoked little debate in
the Senate, aside from an amendment to ensure that the provisions of the bill would not nullify the
Equal Pay AcL. Id. at 441-42, 449-50. It is possible that the inclusion of sex was accepted by the
legislative majority as part of the price of gaining the racial justit.:e that was the focus of the Title
VII debate. If that is true, Title vn would furnish an especially strong example of transfol1native
law insofar as it bans discrimination on the grounds of sex.
74. Though the application of such law to certain cases, like the application of the crime of
murder to abortion or enthanasia, may be quite controversial.

--------------------~~------------
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ative, but even courts may modify private law rules for expressly regulatory
purposes. For example, when the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the
host liability rule," making social hosts liable for serving alcohol to their
guests who were already visibly drunk if they then drove their cars and
caused an accident, the court said it was doing so in order to mitigate the
huge damages that drunk driving inflicts on society. The majority clearly
intended by its ruling to change the behavior of social hosts in a significant
way. Similarly, in the case which led the French Court of Cassation to adopt
a fonn of strict liability for automobile accidents under the French Civil
Code, Procureur General Paul Matter explicitly argued that departure from
the traditional fault principle was necessary to "adapt in a liberal, humane
spirit the text [of the Civil Code] to the realities and requirements of modern life. "76
C.

The Link Between Transformati!'e Law and Judicial Independence of
Courts: Shapiro's Model for the Legitimacy of Courts

The link between transfonnative law and jndicial independence from
executive overreaching is based on Martin Shapiro's77 work on courts. In
the 1970s and 1980s, Shapiro elaborated a model for exploring the issues of
the legitimacy of courts in a comparative way. Although not designed for
this purpose, his model provides a good basis for understanding how transformative law is capable of generating support for judicial independence
from the executive branch. According to Shapiro's theory, which I abbreviate here in order to focus on those parts of his argument which are relevant
to mine, the basic sociopolitical logic of courts is that they have a triadic
structure-two disputing parties and a neutral party acting as judge to resolve the dispute. This triad appeals to a universaJ sense of fairness. If the
judge is neutral, each party has, at least in a formal sense, an equal chance
to win. But the minute the jndge decides for one side, the fairness of the
triad is broken. Now the model looks like two ganging up against the one
loser. Shapiro argues that one way of solving this problem is to have the
dispnting parties pick the judge, as they do in many arbitrations or mediations. It is harder for the loser to view the end-result of the litigation as a
case of two ganging up against one if the loser helped pick the judge. Another way to prevent the triad from breaking down into a dyadic ganging up
of two against one is to allow the judge to find compromise solutions that
give something to each party. But leg.al rules are generally cast in binary,
75. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A,2d 1219, 1224 (N.J. 1984); see also Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d
552,558 (Okla. 1979) (adopting rule for Oklahoma that informed consent standard requires physicians to disclose all material risks to patient).
76. Cour de cassation [Casso ch. n~uns.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction] Feb. 13, 1930,
D.P. J 1930,57, Ripert, S. lur. I 1930, 121, Esmein, translated in part in ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN
& JAMES1r. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 629-31 (2nd ed. 1977).
77. Shapiro is an eminen1 political scientist who has long taught on the Berkeley law faculty.
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all-or-nothing terms: either the plaintiff has a right that should be vindicated
by giving judgment for the plaintiff's whole claim, or he does not, and
judgment has to be given for the defendant. The complexities of the way
different legal rules intersect may permit the court to fashion a compromise
result in some cases, but the whole logic of Western law is premised Oll
binary logic. Official COUlt systems substitute "office" for "consent" --that
is, the litigants are not free to pick their judge but must accept the judge
appointed by the governing regime to hear their case. Office can substitute
for consent, but only if the judge is independent and neutral with respect to
both parties. If the judge's neutrality is suspect, the triad breaks down into
the illegitimate dyad, throwing the court's legitimacy into doubt. Governmental control over the courts is not problematic as long as the disputes
resolved by the judge do not involve the government as an interested party.
But when the government is interested in the outcome, it becomes important to show that the judge is not controlled by the government if the court
is to maintain any legitiluacy78
In accordance with Shapiro's model, as the mix of legal cases coming
before a given court begins to include !Dore cases in which the government
is clearly interested, it should become clearer that dispute resolution by the
courts will only be considered legitimate if the judges enjoy some kind of
protection from executive dominance. Thus it appears that as the executive's stake in cases before the cuurts increases, a culture that supports protecting judicial independence from executive branch control can be
expected to grow in strength. My claim is that in contemporary democracies, much of trans formative law is law in which the executive branch has
an obvious interest, so that instances of transformative law tend to have the
function of highlighting the injustice of executive branch control over the
courts.
The point is easiest to see with respect to public law proceedings that
may include transformative law because in many types of public law litigation, the government is formally a party. For example, the government is a
party in all cases of judicial review of administrative action (suits for
78. Shapiro, Judiciallndepelldence, supm note 21, al577-8J. Although the explanation in
his 1977 article is sufficient for purposes of this paper, Shapiro has set out a much flliler explanation of his theoretical mode! and its implication in SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 1-64. In the fuller
treatment, Shapiro explores further complicating features of courts that put further strain on the
triadic model of a courl. These features include lhe fact that courts engage in numerous administrative acts; that they can be seen as engaged in forms of social control that is based on notions of
the public interest; that they are in effect dispensing a kind of public regulation, and cannot avoid
making law: functions which lhrust the courts inevitably into politics and dictate that political
forces must take control of the courts. 1d. at 20-32. His conclusion is thnt "courts remain problemutical in the sense that considerable tension invUliD.bly exists belween their l'undamelltal claims to
legitimacy and their actual operations." ld. at 37. Shapiro's conclusion is peSSimistic and I do not
mean to imply thtlt he would necessarily agree with my thesis about the power ot' trnnsforl1lutive
law to shift the balance between political responsibility and independence of judges in the din~c
tion of greater independence.
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nondamage remedies like injunctions against and declarations of invalidity
of government action). Cases challenging the constitutionality of statutes
mayor may not involve the state as a formal party, but the executive branch
is generally an interested party because judicial review of statutes on constitutional grounds tcnds to raise issues of high political importance, in which
political leaders in both political branches, legislative and executive, cannot
avoid being interested.
Other types of transformative law, including private law rules, also
may not involve the government directly, but as in the case of judicial review of legislation to which the administTation is not a formal party, the
execntive is likely to have strong interests in litigation involving snch law
becanse of the importance of the social policy at stake. Transformative law,
law to change society, is by definition law that reflects social policy, and
social policy is the stuff of politics. Litigation involving trans formative law
thus inevitablY raises important political issues, so the executive cannot
avoid being a concerned party. For example, a case brought by an individual against a corporate employer under the AD A for failure to make reasonable accommodations inevitahly raises the general issue of how much
society should burden individual employers in order to protect individuals
with disabilities. The U.S. president can be expected to he quite interested
in the general question, whether he or she favors business interests or workers or is merely interested in the global competitiveness of the U.S.
economy.
But if transformative law is generally a kind of law in which the executive branch, headed by a major political leader, tends to have a clear interest, is it not true that the executive may have a clear interest in the
application of certain types of nontransfonnative law, as well? For example,
nontransformative criminal law, like the basic rules against murder or rohbery, simply confirms social consensus that certain types of behavior must
be punished. Nevertheless, in the person of the prosecutor, the executive is
formally involved in every criminal case. Shapiro points out that the "weakening of the triad [his model of court legitimacy 1 is clearest in criminal
law."79 But does the participation of the executive in every criminal prosecution tend to create political concern over executive control over the
courts? As a general matter, I think not. Sadly, few outside the targets of
such ordinary, nontransformative criminal law-some activists and scholars
at most-are likely to be concerned about executive influence on the courts
in these cases, and the targets and their allies are unlikely to constitute a
politically active or influential class that can help in building support for
judicial independence. However, if criminal law is perceived to be employed as a method of oppression, perhaps on racial or religious grounds, of
a certain segment of the popUlation, then the law is being used to transform
79.

SHAPIRO.

supra note 17, at 27.
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society, and if that segment includes politically active members, criminal
prosecution can generate the dynamic in which I am interested. so
Shapiro uses the term "public regulation" to describe the law that invokes executive branch interests.'l I think he means much the same thing as
I mean by "transformative law." I prefer my term chiefly because I think
that public regulation is such a broad term that it could be taken to include
nontransformative public law in which the executive branch really has no
clear interest, but it might also be taken by some to exclude regulation that
achieves its regulatory effect by shaping the rights of private parties against
private parties, as in the case of the private rights of action under the anti··
trust laws, for example, or the other examples of private law previously
mentioned. Shapiro's term is not necessarily inconsistent with the broader
usage, but I believe that "transformative law" is less likely to be misunderstood in either of these ways.
This article thus focuses on trans formative law because it has the potential to mobilize political support for judicial independence. I am not,
however, arguing that the presence of transformative law will necessarily or
quickly result in the adoption of institutional guarantees of judicial independel1Ce. By my account, Western legal systems have long been developing
transformative law, yet, as section IV will show, at least for France and
Great Britain, substantial institutional protections for the judges' independence were only adopted recently. My argument is only that over time, the
more transformative law a society adopts, the greater is the social support
for meaningful levels of judicial independence from the executive, and as
that support grows, it becomes more and more likely that the country will
adopt some kind of protections to curb undue executive int1uence over the
courts if the country remains democratic.
A more conventional thesis about this dynamic is that independent
courts are promoted by the expansion of markets and the development of
multiparty democracy.82 The transformative law thesis is not necessarily
80. Note. in this connection, Shapiro's argument that the burglar subject to prosecution for
burglary may deny or excuse his coodLict in various ways, but he is unlikely to argue that there
should not be a law against burglary, which is why I do not regard the law against burglary as
transfonnative. "It is precisely because [the burglars] perceive the law to be legitimate and the
judge obligated to enforce it that they know he is not a neutral third but a ti'iend of the prosecution." ld. My assumption is that, absent a strong element of politiciziltion due to a perception that
enforcement of sllch law amounts to group oppression on grounds like class, race, or religion, the
burglars of the world normally stand before the criminal courts withoLlt many polilically active
friends. However, if criminal enforcement is politicized, as it arguably is in many countries, especially where there are strong cleavages along the litles of race or religion, then arguably criminal
law is being applied in a transformative way to chatlge the balance of power.

S!. Id.
82. See, e.g., JEI''iNIFER A. WIDNER, BU1LDlNG THE RULE OF LAW 307, 394 (2001) (sllmmarizing thought of Francis NyalaJi. Tanzanian Chief Justice, [976-2000); (j: J. Mark Ramseyer, The
PIt-;.::Jing (llljdepelldeJlce of Courts: A COlllparatif'e APPI'l)(ICIt, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 722
{[ 994) (realistic anticipation that party in power may lose next election is what keeps all parties in
ftlvor of independence of judges; better a neutral judiciary at all times than one controlled by
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inconsistent with this conventional wisdom, but it offers a somewhat better
explanation of the dynamic. The conventional thesis argues that with the
growth of multiparty, competitive democracy, politicallcaders come to see
that they need a neutral court to resolve election disputes and other matters
concerning competitive politics in a fair way. Courts dominated by the political party controlling the executive are obviously unfair. Similarly, the
argument is that as the market economy expands, business leaders see the
need for neutral courts to resolve their disputes. The argument based on
competitive elections is essentially a narrow version of the transformative
law thesis because election law is a type of public law that is transformative
in the same way that most regulatory law is-it establishes and enforces a
set of rules that did not exist before the law in question was adopted, and its
rules are clearly politically salient. The argument based on markets is overbroad by comparison with the transformative law thesis. It is clear enough
wby business leaders would be concerned about the fairness of executivedominated courts handling disputes between the government and businesses, but most of those disputes will also generally involve some form of
transformative law because these dispntes have to do with law adopted to
change business practices. To that extent ~he two explanations are essentially identical. But it is not clear why business leaders would be concerned
about the fairness of executive-dominated courts in the case of commercial
disputes among businesses or between businesses and consumers if the law
concerned is not transfoflnative. The trans formative law thesis thus largely
covers the same cases as the alternative one. It provides a clearer explanation of the dynamic involved than a thesis based on the development of the
market economy would, but it is broader than the thesis about democracy
and markets because it is not limited to conunercial disputes or election
law. The transfoflnative thesis recognizes the way in which general regulaopponents when you are out of power). Strictly speaking, Ramseyer's thesis is abollt why politicians might abstain from interfering witll the courts, not abouL why a segment of the electorate
would favor independent courts, but presumably in a democracy the preferences of elected leaders
and their supporters should be similar. Ramseyer's thesis is thus the electoral half of the more
general conventional thesis that combines an explanation based on ejections with a market-based
explanation,
Landes and Posner advance a theory that is very close to tne transformative thesis. They
argue that interest groups in a democracy tend to favor an independent judiciary (0 enforce the
legislative "deals" the interest groups are able to secure through legislation. William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judicim:v in Gn Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & &ON.
875, 879 (1975). While the transformative thesis does not use the terminology of legislative
"deals," the two theories are similar in lhat both of them postulate that support for judicial independence from the executive comes from groups of voters who are concerned that the executive
might use its power over judges to frustrate the intent of legislation about which they care. In
Landes and Posner's theory, the legislation in question is legislation in which the interest groups
were able to secure certain advantageous terms (the "dea!"), and in the transformative thesis, the
legislation is some kind of law adopted to transform some aspect of society. Since the legislation
tI:!.!lJ .c~n be the subject of legislati¥e "deals" in lhe Landes and Posner theory is generally some
kind of regulatory law, the two theoJies are essentially addressing tile same kind of legislation.
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tion, constitutional and administrative law, and even the development of
tort law doctrines like the social host rule, the informed consent rule for
medical care, or slander and defamation rules for elections may contribute
to the dynamic favoring judicial independence.
The transformative thesis is not meant to be exclusive. There certainly
are other sources of a dynamic that might also favor the development of a
culture of judicial independence. Probably the most important of these is
the pressure exerted on a country by foreign trade and investment. The argument is that a country desirous of obtaining substantial levels of foreign
trade and investment is under pressure to provide independent courts to
guarantee the foreign traders and investors a neutml forum for the resolution of trade and investment disputes. That mechanism could operate independently of the dynamic created by transformative law, and the fact that it
might appear to be the chief factor leading a particular country to establish
meaningful protections for their judges in certain circumstances would not
show that the transformative thesis is false. It would only show that it may
not be the only explanation. However, the need for neutral courts for international trade can be satisfied by special trade courts or arbitral bodies for
international trade and may not necessarily lead to greater independence for
the regular courtS.83 This mechanism therefore does not appear as likely to
be useful to reformers, especially domestic reformers, seeking to increase
judicial independence, Nor do other theories seem as promising a source of
reform strategies as the transformative law thesis. 84
83. In modern China, the government has responded to the pressUI'e of international trade by
eSlablishing a Chinese arbhral body fOf foreign trade disputes, China International Economic &
Trade Arbitration Commission ("CIETAC"). China did so in part because of recognition that its
regular judiciary was considered too likely to be intluenced by provincial bureaucrats to favor
Chinese interests over foreigners. JINGZHOU TAO, ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA xiv

(2004). Whether CIETAC has successfully established a more independent body for dispute resolution is not entirely clear. It has become the international arbitration institution with the largest
caseload in the world, a factor which could indicate a degree of Sllccess but one that also could
simply be attributed to the volume of foreign trade and invesLment involving China. In fact, since
1995, CIETAC has had a steadily declining caseload. Id. at 29-30. In any event, there does not
appear to be any evidence that CIETAC bas affected the continuing lack of independence that
characterizes the regular Chinese judiciary. Xin, supra note 47, at 69-71.
More direct pressure may come from international agreements, of which the WTO is un~
doubtedly the strongest exumple. See, e.g., Quang Nguyen, The Orgallisation alld Operation (l
Admil1i.l'fmrive Cou/'ts in Vierfl(un, ill ASIA EXAMINED: PROCEEDINGS OP THE 15TH BmNNI.A.L CONFERENCE OF THE ASAA, 2004, CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA 27 (Robert Cribb ed., 2000.\.), (ll'£liltlble (It
htl p:1Icaa m bs .an ll.ed u. au/S peei alProj/AS A Albie nni a [-co nferencel2004/ procee dings. htm I (U .S .Vietnamese Trade Agreement requires Vietnam to mnke its judges independent).
84. It has been argued, for example, that judicial independence is promoted by true separation of powers between the legislative and the execut ve branches and that it declines to the extent
that the execlltive increases ils conlrol over the legii;iature. MeNaHga...:t, COllditions for Judicial
independence, 15 J. CONTErvIP. LEGAL ISSUES 105, 108-109 (2006); Tiede, slipm note 1, at
150-52. The collective of authors known as "MeNoligast" have argued that the thesis fits the
development in the United States very well and also fits data from Argentina, Mexico, and Chile.
McNollgast, supra, at 126. It seems right in the sense that a president who is able to dominate the
legislature is unlikely to be willing to be resu;cted by courts ind~pel1dent of his or her power. But
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Law: Personalism and Equality

Lawrence Rosen makes one other intriguing observation about the society in which Islamic law has traditionally been applied which I believe to
be related to the absence of transformalive law and which also may be relevant to significant parts of Latin American societies. The Arab" societies
he has studied, Rosen says, are characterized by intense personalism 86 The
core of that idea is that personal qualities, or what in the West would be
thought of as aspects of a person's character or psychological makeup, are
for traditional Arab thought "aspects of social identity that mean something
only as they cohere in a named individnal. In every domain the attribution
and assessment of others consists of a never-ending process of individuation."87 The cultures may be worlds apart, but the Confucian insistence on Ii
seems similar to the Arab form of personalism insofar as it requires dealing
with each person differently, depending on that person's relationships, status) and rank.
The Arab insistence on "the individual as embodiment"88 has conse-·
quences for the view of the self:
the thesis also suggests that in true parliamentary systems, in which the executive often largely
controls the legislative branch, judges should not have substantial levels of independence, a prediction at odds with what section lY(e) suggests to be the case in Great Britain after the most
recent refonns. The recent strengthening of protections for judicial independence in France, see
il(fra section IV(B), also provides a contrary example because the exe-cutive in France has even
more control over the legislature than is tbe case in Great Britain. See John Reitz, Political Eco/l.om. .' and Separmioll of Powers, 15 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 579, 602-608 (2006).
Finally, I l11ustmention Hiram Chodesh's creative suggestion that court systems may constitute a type of "emergent" system capable of organizing itself and even solving problems without
any master plan or architect. Chodesh, supra note 2, at 591-94. Perhaps he only means to make a
plea for fhe sharing of information and collaborative vmrk on judicial reforms, but the analogy to
emergent systems suggests a view that legal sy~tems have the potential 10 work out reasonable
solutions to their problems without any conscious, guiding force. Chodesh does not suggest any
specific mechanism, but the transfol'm3tive law thesis does. As governments increasingly adopt
transformative Jaw~and they tend to do so in order to deal with problems of industrial and postindustrial society~the political suppOli for curbing unreasonable degrees of executive control
over courts ollght to increase so that it becomes more and more likely that the country will adopt
and enforce sLlch c-urbs so long as it remains a democ:acy and does not concentrate power unduly
in the executive. I am not sure that such a process is inevitable under these conditions; I maintain
only that it is likely.
85. Rosen's observations are based on his work in Morocco, which contains a large and
dominant Arab population, but also a lurge Berber population. He uses the term "Arab" in discussing personalism, ROSEN, supra note II, at 56-72, but of course tbe term is not coterminous with
all Muslims. My purposes are served by accepting the validity of his description of the qadi courts
he observed in Morocco. I leave it to Middle Eastern experts to debate the validity of his observations for other places where Lslamic Jaw is applied.
86. See generally ROSEN, ~;upra note 11, at 56-72 (chapter entitled "Constructing Institutions
in a Political Culture of Personalism"); ROSEN, ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 54,

69,79.
87. ROSEN, ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 54. So Rosen says, quoting an
unnamed writer, "for the Arab) history if) biography." /d, ____" __
88. !d.

._----------------------------
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[1]n Arab culture the self is not divisible as in the West, and. __ as
a result one cannot speak of a series of roles which somehow
stand either separate from that which is properly called the self or
which can be taken on, as masks of the self, allowing thc performance of tasks that may contradict other aspects of one's overall identity."9
For that reason, "[i]llstitutions are attributes of the person, not the other way
around; they are the garments one may wcar, not as part of a distinguishable
role or pcrsona, but as part of one's overall attributes."9o Institutions in the
Arab world thus cannot have the same impersonal sense that they have in
the West, and as one symbol of this difference, Islamic law "has no concept
of the legal person."91
Personalism affects the whole judicial process, as Rosen illustrates
with a story. When he tells his legally knowledgeable informants in Morocco about cases in the United States in which Supreme Court justices
indicated in their opinions that they were ruling in the case in accordance
with what they thought the law required even though their personal feelings
would lead them to a contrary result, the Moroccan informants protested
that he must have left OLlt part of the story that would show why they ruled
as they did. Rosen's informants simply could not accept that an officeholder
like a judge could compm·tmentalize his thinking to act in accordance with
the dictates of his office even if contrary to his personal sense of jnstice.92
Personalism also makes the whole trial process in Islamic courts quite
different from that in Western courts. It has been described as a "law-finding trial[.] .... one in which all cases may be seen as different and particular. and for each of which the precisely appropriate law must be carefully
sought out. The law of each case is thus different from the law of every
other case .... "93 Rosen explains that the qadi's freedom to consult different law sources and stitch together a specific law for the specific case at bar
results from the view that the trial is a "quest for the individuated."9-l In
deciding the case, "the qadi articulates the outer limits of the requisite and
forbidden [for example, the izudud crimes] and, heyond that, seeks not the
89.

ROSEN,

supra note! l. at 67-68.

~O.

Id. at 71.
91. /d ut 64
92. It!. at 56-57, 7 L

93. GLI~:\~, sapra note 52, at 163. It ~hOllld be noted that Islamic law nevcrthele~s does huve
a concept of equul process in the application of [he law. Rosen reports Ihat his juristic informant:,
were not troubled by the fact that the "law-t"int!ing trial" of Islamic law may result in different
judgments for two ditTerent people with similar cases. First, they said, "smce no two indiviJulIb

are c,\tLctly tht' sUint' no two

L'a~es

an; preci:-ely the same," ROSEN,

ANTIIR()puLOCr

OF

h'STICE,

slipm note 2(), ,It 7..1-. t\1ore importantl), the) argued. "if the mode of <lnalysb and facl-finding is

the same in each ellse lllthougil clilTerent judges may reach different conclusions, the results art
equivalent bet:ml~e the pJ\}ce~s \\a~ identical." Id. <It 7-1-~75. According to thi~ aCC()UIlt, Islumic 1<1\\
seeks justice in equ:tI process to find the legal rules, not necessarily in equal ruks for every party.
lJ-L RUSEt\, A:"!TlllWI'OL.OGY Uf' JUSTICE, .vI/tWO note 20. at 5-1-.
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[l]n Arab culture the self is not divisible as in the West, and ... as
a result one cannot speak of a series of roles which somehow
stand either separate from that which is propcrly called the self or
which can be taken on, as masks of the self, allowing the performance of tasks that may contradict other aspects of one's overail identity."9
For that reason, "[i]nstitutions are attributes of the person, not the other way
around; they are the garments one may wear, not as part of a distingnishable
role or persona, bnt as part of one's overall attributes."90·Jnstitutions in the
Arab world thus cannot have the same impersonal sense that they have in
the West, and as one symbol of this difference, Islamie law "has no concept
of the legal person."9!
Personalism affects the whole judicial process, as Rosen illustrates
with a story. When he tells his legally knowledgeable informants in Morocco about cases in the United States in which Snpreme Court justices
indicated in their opinions that they were ruling in the case in accordance
with what they thought the law required even though their personal feelings
would lead them to a contrary result, the Moroccan informants protested
that he must have left out part of the story that would show why they ruled
as they did. Rosen's informants simply could not accept that an officeholder
like a judge conld compartmentalize his thinking to act in accordance with
the dictates of his office even if contrary to his personal sense of jnstice."2
Personalism also makes the whole trial proeess in Islamic courts quite
different from that in Western courts. It has been described as a "law-finding trial[,] .... one in which all cases may be seen as different and particular, and for each of which the precisely appropriate law must be carefully
sought ont. The law of each case is thus different from the law of every
other case .... ""' Rosen explains that the qadi's freedom to consult different law sources and stitch together a specific law for the specific case at bar
results from the view that the trial is a "quest for the individuated.""" In
deciding the case, "the qadi articulates the onter limits of the requisite and
forbidden [for example, the hudud crimes] and, beyond that, seeks not the
tj9. ROSEN, :i!lpm nOle 11, at 67-68,
90. ld at 71.
91. Ill. at 64.
92. /d. at 56-57. 71.
93. GLENN, supm Hule 52, at 163. It should be noted that Islumic law neverthcles:-, cloes have
a concept of cqml1 pruce:-.s in the application of the law. Rosen reports that his juristic inrormanb
were not troubled by the fact tbilt the "law-finding trial" or Islamic Jaw may n~sull in different
judgmenl.S for two different people with similar cases. First, they said. "since no [\VO individuals
are exactly the saille no two cases are precisely the same." RDSfc:N. ANTIlROPOUK1Y OF JUSTICE,
.wpm note 20, at 7-1.. J\ime importantly. they argued. "if the mode of analysis and fact-finding b
the same in each case although different judges may reach different conclusions, th~ results are
equivalent becclllse the proce:-.s Web identical." {d. u[ 74-75. According to this account, Islulllic lav,
seeks justice in t'qual process to find the legal rules, not necessarily in equill rules for every party.
9-1.. ROSE"', ANT1-IIWI'OLOGY OF JUSTICE, s:lpm note 20, al 54.
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each case apparently satisfies a deeply felt need for a highly personalist
approach to human relations. But law cannot be expected to change society
unless it can be applied, as we expect it to be applied in the West, with a
logical consistency that is unaffected by who the parties are except to the
extent that their relevant characteristics are specified in the law itself. For
this reason, I believe that Rosen's observations about the personalism of the
culture in which Moroccan qadi courts operate confirms my understanding
of his work as indicating that the transformative view of law played little or
no role in that culture 97
Like the comparison with traditional Chinese law, the comparison of
modern Western law with the form of the traditional Islamic legal system
studied by Rosen thus highlights the importance for Western legal systems
of a value we may take for granted in Europe and the United States but that
is, I believe, tied to the commitment to transformative law. One of the morally attractive claims at the heart of both Confucian political morality and
traditional Islamic law applied in the personalistic way described by Rosen
is the claim to treat each individual as an individual, not as a cipher or a
fungible unit characterized solely by whatever featllres are called out in the
applicable law. By contrast, we can ap?reciate a cerlain willingness to treat
humans in an "objective" or "abstract" or '~impersonal" fashion in our
Western legal systems. However, in the West, this impersonal approach is
seen more positively, as necessary for achieving the ideal of applying the
law equally to all persons who come within its terms."" The willingness or
ability to treat people in an impersonal way is thus linked to one aspect of
the ideal of equality.
The morally problematic side of Confucian political morality or, indeed, any system that relies primarily on politics, I have argued in section
II(B), is a lack of technical controls to ensure the minimum degree of equal
treatment inherent in the Western idea of law. 99 I believe that similar risks
inhere in the personalistic way that Islamic law is applied. If the law can be
different for every case, then it is easy for legal results to be more favorable
for those who carry advantages of family or clan ties or status or rank.

Islamic law may not be as frankly nonegalitarian as Confucian law codes
specifying different penalties for different classes. In fact, in some impor97. In \iew of the independent role the mufti or scholar pluyed in articulating the law,

SI:'l'

silpru notes 53 and 96, one might argue that transformativc law could have come from that source.

but I find no suggestion that this was so. In an) event, the division of authority that left the qadi in
charge or deciding concrete cases, baseu on the c:adi's fact finding and his stitching togelhel' the
law for the case, Hncllhe mufti in charge of cklemlining rules of law in the abstract renders the
mufti e\'cn ley:. able than tbc qadi to assnre the enforcement of transformative rult':s of law. In light
or Ih~H division of fundion, it is not surprising that we find little or no mention of Iran~Jormatin':

law in the blHIllic legal twdition.
'J8. The tension between personalism and impersonalisl11 surfaces within Western law as
\>,'cll, of cuur~e, as sbov,--n by the controversy over crimi nul .o.entcncing guidelines.
99. Sr.'e supra tnt accomp<mying notes 45-47,

---------------------.--.-~------
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tant ways Islamic law was quite egalitarian. 'oo But like Confucian-dominated Chinese traditional society with its highly personalistic application of
Ii, Islamic law appears to have been applied in a strongly personalistic way
that made relationships and status and rank very important, arguably at least
as important as the terms of law itself. Law that includes such strong forms
of personalism cannot serve very effectively as a tool to transform society,
especially in ways that seek to challenge the substantial social inequalities
built into personalistic systems. Law in societies of personalism appears to
be thought of as a tool that should conform to society more than as a tool
for making society conform to it.

E.

The Apparent Weakness of Belief in Tronsformative Law and Values
Associated with That View of Law in Latin America

One might suppose that a belief in transformative law would permeate
Latin American societies as I claim it does U.S. and Western European
societies. After all, Latin America is part of the West and heir to the slow,
steady development of transformative law in Western legal history to which
I have pointed in section III(B). Latin America has elected legislatures,
codes of law, and public law including constitutional and administrative
law. In fact, Latin American law includes substantial examples of transformative law, and I will suggest in section VeE) some strategies for working with that kind of law to promote greater judicial independence. But
there are grounds for suspecting that confidence in the transformative
power of law may be weak in Latin America. Keith Rosenn has described a
culture of legalism in Brazil, in which laws are passed in great volume to
solve specific problems but without any serious efforts to ensure enforcement so that the law remains unenforced. lol Such a culture would obviously
weaken any belief in transfonnative law. There are also grounds to believe
that forms of personalism remain strong in Latin America and may also
weaken cultural support for transfonnative law.
One might suppose that the ability to deal with people impersonally
and the ideal that law should be applied in an impersonal manner are so
widely shared in the modern world that personalistic views of law like those
Rosen describes are simply not relevant to modern society in Latin
America. One might think that globalization and urbanization, both features
certainly affecting Latin America, would have effectively reduced personalism in Latin American society to the point of unimportance. However, we
must remember that Rosen's descriptim of Arab personalism is based on
his observations of contemporary sharia courts in Morocco. Personalism is
100. See, e.g., Timur Kuran, The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Len\-': Origins and
Persistence, 53 AM. 1. COMPo L. 785, 816 (2005) ("Islam's relatively egalitarian inheritance system" required division of estates among all the heirs instead of the system of primogenitme that
was more typical of the medieval Western tradition.).
101. Rosenn, Brazil's' Legal Culture, supra note 14, at 19.
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not a relic of the past and is undoubtedly a feature of all societies to some
extent. In its most basic form, it simply represents the view that relationships, status, and rank sbould be taken into account in dealing with other
people. A form of personalism is found wherever ties of family, clan, tribe,
or ethnic group can be expected to be very important in people's social
dealings, and that may include most, if not all, human society. But forms of
personalism are inconsistent with a culture of transformative law when they
are strong enough that one cannot generally expect law to be applied according to its terms if it conflicts with the treatment that one party owes
another party or the judge owes the parties based on personal or family
connections, or rank or status.
There are reasons to think that personalism is still strong in Latin
America. After the revolutions against Spain, the weakness of the newly
independent governments led to civil war and caudillismo. As Mark Ungar
explains, "[Elverywhere, provincial caudillos carved out personalistic regimes with separate armies and governments." '02 Other authors have mentioned the continued existence in at least some parts of Latin America of
this form of personalism (also called "clientelism") in which a leader (the
caudillo or patrao) gives his followers protection and welfare in return for
loyalty and service. l03 Like other forms of personalism, such a form of so··
cial and political organization makes certain people more important than
others based on extralegal factors of relationship or status in a way that
seems inconsistent with a view of law as rransformative. It could interfere
with the kind of impersonal application of the law that is required for transformative law and therefore appears to be an important aspect of the relevant culture that reformers need to take into account.
IV.

HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRUCTURAL
GUARANTEES FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES, FRANCE, AND GREAT BRITAIN

In order to put some t1esh of actual facts on the bones of theory, this
section reviews the history of the adoption of structural protections for judicial independence in three Western countries, the United States, France, anel
Great Britain. The three countries are not presented as ideal models. They
102. UNGAR, supra note 3, at 23.
103. See, e.g., LEWlS, supra note 40, at 14-15,27-29,246 (describing history and dynamic of

caudillo strongmen in Latin America; in modem era of mass politics, caudillo becomes charismatic party leader benefitting his follOWing with renewable resources or state, jobs, contracts,
welfare, and graft); 1m-IN PEELER, BUILDING DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 105-37,200 (1998)
(explaining modern forms of c{ludillismo in authoritarian regimes in Parguay, Mexico, and Cuba:
continuing power of clientelis111 in age of democracy); See (ilso ROBERT L. GILMORE, CAUDILUSM
AND M1LlTARISM IN VENEZUELA, 1810-]910,57-68 (1964) (tracing how caudillismo evolved into
a more despotic presidential form in Venezuela); (.j: Rosenn, Brazil's Legc!l Culture, supra note
14, at 14-15, 17-19 (discussing persoflalismo, by which he means "a strong sense of loyalty and
obligation towards family and friends" and "the patrtio (patron) complex of traditional Brazil"),
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are simply three concrete examples of Western countries that have by now
adopted significant forms of institutional protections for its jndges.
This history is reviewed here primarily to show the striking temporal
correspondence, at least for these three countries, between adoption of
structural guarantees for judicial independence and judicial review of legislation, which I have argued to be an especially important source of transformative law. This cOlTespondence arguably provides support for the
transformative law thesis. The history also illustrates several points from
the discussion in section II concerning the tension between politics and law
at the heart of the rule of law ideology. First, at least for France and Great
Britain, the adoption of structural protections for judges is surprisingly recent,104 so even in the West politics have long trumped judicial independence to a considerable extent. Second, the actual stnlctural protections that
have been adopted have tended to leave room for some political influence
in the selection of judges, thus confirming the conclusion in section II that
the rule of law has to involve a balance between jndicial independence and
political oversight or influence. Third, much of this history, especially the
more recent history, shows a coneem primarily for executive dominance,
which section II argued to be the most important counterweight or thrcat to
judicial independence in modern democracies. After a subsection tracing
the history for each of these countries, a concluding subsection will discuss
each of these points.
A.

The United States

The real beginning of institutional design to assure reasonable judicial
independence from both executive and legislative control took place in the
drafting of the U.S. federal constitution in the late 1780s. Control over the
judiciary had actually long been an issue in the English-speaking world.
One of the claims over which the Stuart kings of England clashed with
Parliament concerned their claim to dismiss British judges whenever they
pleased.")5 By the Act of Settlement in 1701 (effective in 1714), Parliament
abolished the British king's right to dismiss judges but arrogated that power
104. I confess to being surprised when I researched this history, and I am apparently not alone.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 82, at 876 (arguing that Article III of the U.S. Constitution
provides substantial independence to federal judges and then saying, "[tJo a Jesser degree, the
same thing may be said of ... judges in many other cOlllltries, and, for lhat mauer, of judges at all
levels, in America and elsewhere, long before Article III was conceived"), Section IY(A) below
shows that Article m was really the first meaningful set of institutional protections against political control over the judiciary.
105. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 Oth ed, 1998); Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Separati01l QrPm1-'ers: judicial Independence, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 108, 110-11(970); MARY
L. VOLCANSEK & JACQUELINE LUCIENNE L,AFO:"-J, JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE CRoss-EvOLUTION OF
FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACTICES 17-18 (1988); Shapiro, Judicial Independence, suprn note 21,
at 620-21. More than other royal families in British history, the Stualts asserted claims to absolute
power.
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to itself, thus exchanging one judicial overlord for another. 106 The British
king continued, however, to assert his right to discharge colonial judges at
his pleasure, and the king's tampering with the courts became one of the
particular grievances pressed by the colonists against the Crown at the time
of the American Revolution. 107
The U.S. Constitution was drafted on the heels of that history, and
since its entry into force in 1789 and the creation of the lower federal judiciary in the same year, the U.S. Constitution has provided the institutional
protections that U.S. federal judges still enjoy today. U.S. federal judges
must be selected through a system of checks and balances in which the
president nominates, but the senate must approve by a majority. lOB The
judges may not be discharged except by impeachment for serious misbe·
9
havior, and their pay may not be reduced during their time in office.10
These institutional provisions do not eliminate political influence. They use
the system of checks and balances to let executive and legislative power
check each other in the nomination of judges. But they also give the judges,
once in office, the very substantial protection of lifetime tenure and security
of pay. Of course, federal judges are subject to impeachment, but impeachment has turned out to be a very blunt instrument of political control because it is so difficult to use. IIO
While it may not be certain that the U.S. creation of institutional guarantees of judicial independence occurred in express contemplation of the
106, Ervin, supra note LOS, l~t 111-12; Shapiro. Judicial Independence, supra note 21, at
620-22. By rules which did not take effect until 1760, judges held their office qUClllldiu Sf! belle
gesserit (during good behavior), but they also remained subject to removal from office by impeachment or a joint address of the houses of Parliament. Ervin, supra note 105, at tll-12,
107. VOl.CANSEK & LAFON, supra note 105, at 19; Ervin, supm note 105, at 112.
108. Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 states in relevant part that the President "shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senne, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme
Court." Lower federal court judges are not literally prolected in this manner by the U.S. Constitution, but in fact they are also appointed in this manner. ABRAHAM, supra note lOS, at 21.
109. Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. ConstilUtion reads:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from tlme to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the suprem~ and inrerior Courts, shall hold their Offices dllring good
Behaviour, and shan, at stated Times, receive I'\x their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
The Impeachment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Article II, Section 4 ("The President, Vice
President and all civil Officers or the United Slates, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."), does
not literally apply to Article III judges, but the phl':lse "during good Behaviour" in Article In,
Section 1, is taken to refer to the same mechanism. VAN-BOA To, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
242-46 (2006).
110. To remove a federal judge requires impeachment by the HOLlse and conviction by twothirds of the Senate. Ser U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, d. 6. It ii:i "a very
arduoLls process, both procedurally and substantively." To, .'iI/pm note 109, at 244. It is so arduous, in fact, lhat since 1789, only Lhirteen of the forty-seven impeachment cases opened against
federal judges have proceeded to the Senate for trial, and only seven of those cases have resulted
in a conviction. Id.; {ICCOJ'd ABRAHAM, S!lpnl note IDS, at 42-51.
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introduction of judicial review of legislation, Marbury v. Modison III was
decided only fourteen years after the Constitution entered into force, and
already prior to and during the process of drafting and ratifying the Constitution, some state courts had held state legislation invalid on the grounds of
violation of the state constitution."" It seems fair to say that the idea of
judicial review of legislation was "in the air" at the time the U.S. Constitution adopted very substantial structural guarantees of judicial independence.
The fede[al system of structural guarantees of judicial independence
has not been changed since 1789. But in the Jacksonian era's renewed em··
phasis on popular democracy, the states were swept by enthusiasm for elective methods of judicial selection, and despite continued experimentation at
the state level, we can say as a generalization that the states today have
various forms of popular election for fixed terms although a few states use
purely appointive systems for judicial selection. "3 The most popular system of state judicial appointment has been a combination of appointive and
electoral systems known as the Missouri Plan. Under this system, the state
governor appoints a judge from a list drawn up by a nonpartisan nominating
commission composed of representatives from the bench, bar, and public,
and after a short initial term, that judge then has to be confirmed in an
unopposed election for a full term of office and any subsequent terms of
reelection. ' J4 The states have thus also shown great attention to the issue of
structural ways of protecting judges from control by either the executive or
the legislature, but they have chosen rather different methods from those of
the federal constitution.

Ill. 5 U.S. (1 Cmnch) 137 (1803).
J 12, Volcansek and Lafon mention without citation Trel'ert 1'. Weeden in Rhode Island in 1786
ilnd Bayard 1', Singleton in North Carolina in 1787, YOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 105, at 2425. For the Bayard case citation, see Bayard v. SingleLon, 1 N.C. (MarL) 5 (N.c' 1787). For the
Trewt{ case, see JAMES M. VARNUM, THE CASE TREVETT AGAINST WEEDEN (1787) (pamphlet
containing all Lhe main documents and speeches in connection with the case as well as deliberations of the Rhode Island legislature considering whether to impeaCh the judges for refusing to
enforce the stalUte), document available in Gale Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale
Document No. CW I 23874424. See also JEFFERSON POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER 72-101
(1991) (section of sourcebook on early American constitulional history devoted to the emergence
and development of judiCial review, mentioning arguments for judicial review asserted in vain in
Massachusetts courts as early as 1761; an example of judges in Virginia in 1788 asserting the
power to refuse to enforce a slatute they deemed unconstitutional; several cases after adoption of
the Constitution bllt prior to Mw-bury v. Madison; ancl commentaries by James Kenl). Powell's
summary is that, while the constitutional clebates at ~he Philadelphia convention "did not pay close
attention to the ql1e:o>tioll of judicial review, for the most part. . it seems fair La assert that
supporters ancl opponents alike assumed that some form of it would exisL" !d. at 72.
113. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 105, at 76. "In fact, eighty-six percent of American
judges run for election and slate courts where judges sit for election hear the majority of all
litigation in tbe United States." Tiede, supra note I, at 140 (footnotes omitted).
114. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, HljJrCl note 105, at 135-40.
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France

The history of judges in France ,tarts with a cautionary example of the
dangers of judges subject to no political control. The French kings, desperate to raise funds, created a rather extreme form of judicial independence
through the system of venality or sale of' judicial office, 115 a development
that is smely ironic in view of the French royal claim to absolute power.
The system of venality gave the French judges of the ancien regime an
extraordinary level of independence, and may well have contributed to the
degree to which the highest courts were willing to confront the king through
their power to make regulations for their territories and to refuse to register
royal edicts and ordinances which they thought against the public good or
fundamental law. In the end, the courts came to be viewed as obstructive
servants of the ancien regime, and a chief enemy of the revolution. Thc
legacy was postrevolutionary suspicion of the judges. 116
Although the democratic fervor of the French revolutionaries led them
to adopt election of judges immediately after the fall of the ancien regime,
the pattern of executive appointment of judges by political leaders began to
assert itself during the Directoire. In the constitution of 1799, Napoleon
assigned himself, as first consul, the task of appointing judges, originally
from lists of notables. I I? "Judges, as a result, were men of the executive
branch.""" Thus, shortly after the French Revolution, the pattern was established of execulive dominance in the recruitment of the judiciary that was to
become characteristic for France 1 19
The history of the French judiciary in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries was one of ever-increasing bureaucratization, with both its positive and negative effects. lOG "As the modern magistrature was organized,
Il5. In 1467, King LOllis XI affirmed thatjrdges who had purchased their office could not be
removed, thereby giving the judges the guarantee of irremovability during their tenure. Marie
Seong-Hak Kim, "GmH'ernemefit des luges" 011 "luges du Gouvernement"? The Revolutionary
Traditions and JudiciaZIndependence ill France, 26 KORE.·\N J. INT'L & COMPo L. 1,8 (1998). BlIt
see VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 105, at 44 (fixing the date at 1522). In 1604, that security in
office was extended by recognition that the purchased office was hereditary. Id.
116. Kim, supra note 115, at 9-10. As Kim S~lyS:
Throughout the eighteenth century, the pariements [the chief French courts] consistently
refused to register those royal enactments of whicb [hey disapproved. The judges re~
garded themselves as guardians of the laws of France, with a duty and a right to supervise the legislative process. They claimed to represent the national interest against
authoritarian government. Tile inevitable consequence of the courts' consistent interference in political lTI<.H[ers was, however, that they increasingly became obstructive,
preventing any reforms ... which the government clesperalely needed to implement to
save the monarchy on the eve of the Revolution.
ld. at 9.
117. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 105, at 59, 66-69,100-01.
118. Id. at 101.
119. "The principles affirmed throughout tlte nineLeenth and twel.ltkth centuries recognized
clearly that the executive power \vas master in recruiting the judiciary." ld. at 103.
120. Unlike the common law pattern of recruitment of judges from the ranks '01' experienced
lawyers, Napoleon wanted to bring young men into the judiciary so they could be trained. id. at
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common practice was that a judge stayed in office for his lifetime."]2] The
principle of irremovability was discussed, but it did not give French judges
much of a sense of security in office. RatJoer, all the way into World War II,
the judicial ranks were regularly subject to purges on political grounds after
each change of regime (of which there were many in France in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). ]22 Moreover, judges were subject to disciplinary proceedings by the executive.]2' The judges were subject to an
"obligation of reserve," a term which came to mean not only that the judges
were forbidden to adopt a position contrary to that of the government, but
also that they could be disciplined on this basis. "Confronted by these two
principles, the judges lost all illusions of independence."]24
The situation did not change for the judges until the inauguration of
the Fifth Republic of France in 1958, whieh is also when France first
adopted a form of judicial review of legislation. The 1958 Constitution
adopted a system of judicial review of legislation in the form of a Constitutional Council.]25 Until the reforms of 2008, judicial review was restricted
to bills before they were signed into law by the president. Despite the formal limitation, this French style of judicial review tumed out to playa very
significant role in the political life of the country starting in the 1970s.]26
106. But younger judges me[lnt greater interest in subsequent promotions, and the judiciary eager
for promotions was a judiciary subject to influence by the executive that held the power of promo~
tion. Competitive examinations were first proposed in 1835 but nOl actually introduced until 1875,
uul UnCi 1878, guvelIlIllelll millisters halted the ex.ams because they saw that the exams were
limiting their prerogatives to confer judicial appointments. An examjnation system was successfully instituted by decrees in 1906 and 1908. Id. at 109-10; see also Doris M. Provine & Antoine
Garapon, The Selection of Judges in France: Searching for a New Legitimacy, ill. ApPOlNTING
JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 176,
183 (Kate MalJeson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006).
121. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 105, at 115.
122. Volcansek and Lafon mention purges after regime changes in 1814, 1830, 1848, 1852,
1871, and 1940. But there were also purges of the judiciary "even when a new orientation was
given lO a regime, as in 1807, 1810, 1883, and 1941." !d. at 110. These authors also mention two
instances of a regime purging its own judges, first in 1807 and 1810 when Napoleon eliminated
judges with revolutionary backgrounds in order to appeal to the old aristocracy, and again in 1941
when the Vichy government dismissed Jewish judges. ld. at 121.
J 23. In 1802, the Minister of Justice was given the power to preside over a disciplinary tribunal which could suspend a judge and call him to account for his attitudes. Id. at 117.
124. ld. at 118.
125. F.L. Morton, Judicia! Review in France: A C01J1pClrative Analysis, 36 AM. J. COMPo L.
89,90 (1988). It is obligatory to note that the Constitlltional Council was deliberately established
as a "non-court" 80 that the French could maintain their principle of parliamentary supremacy.
The Council is quite different from the regular coutts, Nevertheless, it is now generally recognized
that the Council functions as a type of constitutional court. TIM KOOPMANS, COURTS AND POLlTJ·
CAL INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 74-76 (2003).
126. Two events greatly expanded the Council's power. In 1971, in a freedom of association
cuse, the Council read into the Preamble of the 1958 Constitution all the civil liberties and human
rights in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Preamble of the Constitution of the
Fourth Republic, thus greatly expanding the potential for French constitutional law to include
transformative law affecting human rights. In 1974, a technical amendment to the standing rules
made it possible for the political opposition to refer a bill to the Council as long as they could
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Reforms in 2008 promise to make constitutional review even more important in France by permitting the regular and administrative courts to refer
issues of constitutionality to the Constitutional Council from litigation
pending before them.' 27
The design of the Constitutional Council shows concern for the independence of the constitutional judges. France chose an explicitly political
way of achieving the right balance between political influence and judicial
independence and, with regard to political influence, between executive and
legislative branch int1uence. The Council is composed of nine members and
they need not have legal credentials or experience. In fact, they are appointed by politicians and tend to be politicians, themselves. Of the nine
members, three are appointed by the president of the republic, three by the
president of the lower house, and three by the president of the upper house
of the legislature, and the terms are staggered so that a third of the Council
is replaced every three years, one by the chief executive power and two by
legislative powers. Independence is secured after appointment by limiting
each member of the Council to one nonrenewable nine-year term.128 It has
been pointed oul that with two-thirds of the membership changing every six
years, this is a system that is designed to keep the constitutional judges
closely in step with major political movements in the country.129
In the same time period during which France was adopting judicial
review, it was also adopting for the first time a series of institutional ways
of protecting its regular judges from executive branch control. Ordinance
no. 58-1270 of December 22, 1958, provided lifetime tenure and further
specified that no judge may be transferred or promoted without his or her
consent. I3O Perhaps most importantly, the ordinance also established a judicial training center, today known as the Ecole nationale de la magistrature
(ENM). Admission to ENM is by competitive exam, all students pass the
twenty-eight-month training program though grades playa role in determining what kind of judicial appointments 2re given, and ENM graduates pro-.
vide most of the appointments to both the juqiciary and the ranks of the
prosecutors. This system of appointment after competitive examinations
sharply limits the scope for executive influence in the process of making
initial appointments. 131
muster 60 votes in either the Assembly or the Senate, thus greatly expanding the ease with which
bills could be challenged in the Council. Morton, supra note 125, at 90~91,
127. Alec Stone Sweet, The Coltstirurional COllllcil Wid the Trcm~1'orm{ftiol1 of the Republic, in
(forthcoming 2008), {/milable at http://works,bepress.

CAHIERS DU CONS61L CONSTITUTIONNEL

comlalee _stone _5 weet/2 3.
[28. To, supra note 109, at 309; Provine & Garapon, .wpm note 120, at 180-82.

129. Morton, SIIpru note 125, aI 98-101.
130. To, supra note 109, at 123.
131.

183-84.
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Protection from executive dominance in that process is, however, not
as strong a guarantor of judicial independence in France as it is in the
United States because, unlike the common law pattern of recruitment of
judges from the more senior ranks of the practicing bar, the French pattern
developed in the course of the nineteenth century into a career judiciary. A
desire to be promoted exposes a judge to repeated appointment proceedings,
which give the appointing power-typically the executive in the career judiciaries of the civil law-repeated opportunities to punish the judge for
earlier decisions the appointing power does not like by denying the request
for a promotion. The ambitious judge thus repeatedly comes under pressure
to conform to the legal views of the executive branch. For that reason, in a
career judiciary, like that of France, limitations on executive influence over
judicial promotions are vitally important.
In the Fifth Republic, executive power over judicial appointment was
further reduced by the Conseit superieur de fa magistrature (CSM), a collegial body governing the magistracy, which in France includes both the regular judges and all prosecutors. The CSM has the power to make
nominations to the president of the republic with respect to appointment of
the highest judicial offices in the regular court system. Even though the
CSM only nominates the highest judges, its nominations are in effect determinative because the president has no information upon which to disagree.
Prior to 1993, the president might have been able to control the CSM nominations indirectly through his power to appoint the members of the CSM,
but constitutional reforms in 1993 diminished his power substantially.'32
Opinion appears nevertheless divided as to whether the appointment of
these most important judicial positions is effectively controlled by or insulated from the executive poweL I33 At any rate, in the 1993 reforms, the
number of highest judicial offices in effect determined by CSM nomination
was expanded to cover more judges so that today approximately the top
four hundred judges are covered. 134
132. Kim, supra note 115, at 30-31. Prior to 1993, the President of the Republic chose all the
members of the CSM. By reforms in 1993, the President's power was reduced to choosing one
member. For descriptions of the complicated way in which the rest of the membership is chosen
(the specific COUl1s from which certain members must be selected and the other nonjudicial groups

who are represented), see To, supra note 109, at 327; Kim, supra note 115, at 31 n.91. The
President of the Republic and the Minister of Justice preside at the meetings, and there are ten
other members. Id.
133. The President's participation is said to be a formality only, and the President and Minister of Justice can easily be outvoted by the oliler members. To, sllpra note 109, at 327,342,344;
Kim, SUpf'{/ note 1 J 5, at 33-34; Provine & Garapon, supra llote 120, at 184-85. Provine and
Garapon say ve-ry confidently that the appointment process for the senior judges is "wholly inslllated from political oversight." Id. at 185.
134. Prior to the 1993 reforms, that appointment power included the COli!' de cclss(ftian <the
supreme comi for the regular court system) and first presidents of the courts of appeals. As a
result of the reforms, that appointment power was extended to include the presidents of the most
imporlElllt regular first instance courts (tribul1({ux de grande instance). Kim, supra note 115, at 33;
Provine & Garapon, supra note 120, at 185.
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For all other regular judges and prosecutors (over six thousand positions 135), it is the minister of justice who makes the determinative nominations, and the CSM can make only a recommendation on each candidate,
which the minister of justice is free to ignore. 136 The promotion process for
the highest judges may thus exclude executive branch influence to a large
extent, but the promotion process for the great mass of lower judges does
not,137 and in a career bureaucracy like the French judiciary, one does not
come to be considered for the highest posts without having advanced up the
ranks from the lower judiciary, where the influence of the minister of justice is strong. Marie Seong-Hak Kim reports that "the political persuasion
of an individual judge is often an important factor in determining the more
or less rapid advancement of that judge." 138
Disciplinary matters have been better shielded from executive branch
involvement. The CSM also resolves disciplinary charges against judges,
but in this case, neither the president of the republic nor the minister of
justice presides over the council as they otherwise do ex officio, and, as
already mentioned, the reforms in 1993 further reduced the president's
power to influence the CSM. The institutional structure for judicial discipline is thus one of the strongest protections for judicial independence. 139
The other development in the Fifth Republic that is thought to have
contributed importantly to judicial independence from the executive was the
creation of the Syndicat de la magistrature on June 12, 1968. The formation
of the Syndicat, a union for judges, is meant to strengthen the judges' abil-·
ity to withstand external pressures. In particular, the union has vocally
"condemned hierarchy in the judiciary as an excessive burden on a judge's
position that obliges him to adopt a conformist attitude for the satisfaction
of his superiors."14o It appears that the creation of ENM, the judicial training center, may have been the catalyst for the formation of a judicial union
because, through the training at ENYl, judicial trainees became "accustomed to collective discussion and action.,,141

135. Kim, supra note 115, at 33; Provine & Qurapan, supra note 120, at 184.
136. To, supra note 109, at 342-44 (describing the complex process for deCiding on

promotions).
137. Id. at 344; Kim, supm note 115, at 32-34, 38-39,
138. Kim, supra note 115, at 32.
139. To, suprfl note 109, at 336-37, 347-48; Kim, slIpm note 115, m 30. This protection and
the proclamation of the principle of irremovability in Article 65 of the 1958 Constitution must, to
a significant extent, neutralize the effect of the provision in the Ordinance of December 22, 1958,
imposing the "obligation of reserve" (the term that had been used in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries to bind judges to the goveument's positions). See VOLCANSEK & LAFON,
supra note 105, at 123 (Ordinance of December 22, 1958); supra text accompanying note 123-24
(use of term in earlier bistory).
140. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 105, at 132; see also Kim, mpra note 115, at..fO n.124.
141. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 105, at 132 (footnote omitted).
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Thus far we bave been talking abou:: the regular courts and the Constitutional Council, but France also has a set of administrative courtS.J42 The
administrative court judges have only much more recently been granted any
guarantees of independence, and they are considerably weaker than the
guarantees given to the regular judges. Traditionally considered administrative personnel within the Council of State, the judges of the lower administrative courts (flfSt instance and appeal) finally received substantial
guarantees of independence in 1986, when they were given a number of the
same protections that the regular judges had received. These protections
include the principle of irremovability and a selection and promotion process that restricts the president's discretion in making appointments by limiting him to lists of candidates furnished by a nominating council. However,
unlike the regular judges, who enjoy relatively strong protections against
executive branch interference with respect to discipline, the administrative
judges are still subject to discipline by the administration, which is always a
party to the cases before them, and the members of the Council of State (the
highest level of administrative court judge) are also excluded from the protections concerning appointment and advancement. 143 In short, they remain
subject to a system that could be used to exert fairly strong executive control, and French commentators appear split on the degree to which that control is actually nsed.'44
In snm, the first set of changes in the wake of the 1958 Constitution,
which introduced judicial review in France, strengthened the independence
of the regular judiciary by instituting a judicial training centcr and an initial
appointment process that is almost wholly insulated from the executive, as
well as creation of a judicial union in 1968. Promotions, except to the highest levels within the regular court system, remain in the control of the min142. As in the case of the Constitutional Tribunal, it is obligatory 10 note that the bodies
reviewing administrative action were deliberately set up as part of the administration and not part
of the court system. They were not OiiginalJy designated as "courts" and the highest administrative
court in France is still just one section of a major French administrative body, the Council of State.
None of the administrative judges are considered part of the "magistracy," which includes the
regular judges and prosecutors. Yet it is clear that they in effect perform the same function as
administrative judges in other countries that have separate administrative courts. Provine &
Garapon, supra note 120, at 189.
143. To, supra note 109, at 344-50.
144. DANIEL CHABANOL, LE JUGE ADMINISTRATIF 15-18 (1993) (administrative judges in fact
generally independent at all levels; however, author discusses only lower administrative judges);
JACQUES CHEVALLlER, L'ELABORATION HISTORIQUE DU PRINCIPE DE SEPARATION DE LA JURIDIC·

10 (1970) (judicial independence essentially depends on good graces of those in power)~ OUVIER GOHlN, CONTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF
71-76 (2d ed. 1999) (optimistic about independenC':;'! after the reforms; pointing out that only
twenty judges have been dismissed from COl1seil d'Etat without pension); DANIELE LOSCI-IAK, LE
ROLE POLlTIQUE DU JUGE ADM1NISTRATIF FRANC;AIS 13-33 (1972) (writing before reforms; administrative judges have little independence); JACQUES VIGUIER, LE CONTENTlEUX ADMINSTRATIF
12,28 (2e1 ed, 2005) (positive about judicial-independence for administrative camts after reforms;
but noting the vulne-rability of the judges on the Consei! d'ETat).
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ister of justice, but promotions to the highest levels, as well as disciplinary
procedures at all levels of the magistracy, are relatively well shielded from
executive control. Judicial review, first established in 1958, was substantially strengthened in the 1970s, and the constitutional reform of 1993 further reduced the possibility of executive power over promotions and
disciplinary proceedings by greatly diminishing executive power to appoint
the CSM, the judicial nominating and disciplinary body. In addition, pursuant to changes in 1986, most of the administrative court judges, but not the
highest ones, began to enjoy similar protections from executive control over
selection, but none of the administrative law jndges are protected from what
is perhaps the greatest form of executive control, the power to discipline
sitting judges. As a result of these developments, at least the regular judiciary can finally think of their career as a reasonably secure one. 145
C.

Great Britain

In the centuries after Parliament's victory over Stuart pretentions to
absolutism, England evolved for itself a system that apparently gave British
judges considerable independence in fact though the institutional arrangements suggested, first, at least a kind of symbolic dominance by Parliament,
and later, and more substantially, by the executive. In the first place, the
supreme appeal jurisdiction actually developed in Parliament, in the appeals
jurisdiction of the House of I "ords, 146 though as the judicial chamher of the

House of Lords developed, it became clear that it was treated as a true
court, and the judges in the judicial chamber of the House of Lords developed a practice of abstaining from participation in the legislative functions
of the House of Lords. More significantly, the development of the system of
appointment of judges by the Lord Chancellor appeared to subject the
judges to strong political int1uence by the executive. 147 While in theory the
Lord Chancellor was a member of all three branches of government-a
personal violation of the separation of powers doctrine-he was appointed
by the prime minister as part of the cabinet and was therefore first and
foremost a representative of executive power. Especially because of the almost complete lack of transparency in this function, judicial appointment by
the Lord Chancellor thus appeared to be open to the free play of politics.
While it has been stoutly maintained that the system actually functioned
largely in a nonpolitical way that emphasized professional merit, there are
examples of politicization of the process throughout the twentieth
century. 148
145. VOLCAr-iSEK & LAf'ON, supm note 105, at 129.
146. Shapiro, Judicial II/dependence, supm note 21, at 626.
147. ld. at 632; see a/so AI3RAHAM, Slipi'll note 105, at 31-34.
148. Kate Malleson, 111c New Judicial AppoiiHrncms Commission ill Eng/WId WId W(I/t's: Nen
Wille ill New Bottles?, in ApPO[NTlNG JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICI.·\L POWER 39, 41--+2 (Kate
Malleson & Peter H. Russel! eds., 2006); Stevens, .wpm note 12, at 613-14.
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The rules on dismissal might appear to give judges better protection
from politics, By a provision of the Act of Settlement, British judges have
in theory been protected against political dismissals since 1760, when the
provision took effect, subject only to impeachment by both houses of Parliament.'49 It eventually became clear that the impeachment threat was not
substantial. "[S]ince the Act of Settlement of 1701, only one judge has been
removed on any grounds," 150 and it ha5 been asserted that "dismissal of a
[British] judge for political reasons is impossible today for all practical purposes,"'51 However, Stevens points out that technically such a statement
can be made only about the judges on the major C0U11s (High Court, Court
of Appeals, and the House of Lords) because "the vast bulk of the full-time
judiciary in England (now some 1300) have no protection under the Act of
Settlement, although in fairness to the Lord Chancellor's Department, dismissals are handled with considerahle natural justice [what is called in the
United States "due process"],"152 More importantly, Stevens cites a number
of significant instances in the course of the twentieth century in which the
prime minister or Lord Chancellor was able to put substantial pressure on
judges from the major courts to resign, sometimes with success, '53
The whole system was criticized as not being sufficiently "modern," It
was argued that even if the current system was not working in a particularly
politicized way, the lack of any safeguard keeping the Lord Chancellor
from playing politics, especially in the process of judicial appointments,
was troubling, The lack of safeguards, the absence of a more clearly fair
system for judicial appointments, and the lack of sufficient diversity in the
makeup of the judiciary were argued to undermine public confidence in the
courts I54 As a result, around the turn of the millennium, Great Britain undertook some sweeping changes with regard to its judicial appointments
system, but they were part of a much broader set of changes that can only
be termed a constitutional revolution, 155
One important chapter of that revolution took place in 1998, when
Great Britain finally adopted a limited, but important form of judicial review of legislation, Although the British have long steadfastly adhered to
the principle of parliamentary supremacy, in 1998 they adopted the Human
Rights Act, a statute which incorporates into British law the European Con149. See supru text following note 105.
150. ABRAHAM, supra note 105, at 52.
IS!. Id. at 52.
152. Steven,~, supra note 12, at 60 I. These less-protected judges include circuit judges, recorders, district judges, and magistrates. For the hierarchy of judges in the British legal system, see
GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, ENGUSH LEGAL SYSTEM 237~38 (8th ed. 2006).
153. Stevens, supra note 12, at 600~01. Similarly, the government ha,<; succeeded in cutting
judicial salaries on occasion. ld. at 615~16.
154. Malleson, supra note 148, at 40~41.
155. Colin Picker, "A Ught unfo the I\fations"-The New British Federalism, the Scottish
ParfiClIl1f:'IIf, (I/J.d Consfitutional Lessons for Mliitietiwic Stales, 77 TuL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2002).
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vention on Human Rights as a statutory bill of rights. Pursuant to that act,
the British courts may not refuse to follow statutes that they deem incompatible with that statutory bill of rights. Instead, they are enjoined to interpret statutes to be consistent with the Human Rights Act, if possible. If they
cannot interpret a statute to be consistent with the Human Rights Act, then,
while giving effect to the inconsistent act, certain specified higher British
courts may also make a declaration of incompatibility. While that declaration places no obligation on Parliament to amend the statute in question, it
does empower the executive branch and Parliament, if the political will is
there, to work together on a fast-track basis to amend the statute to bring it
into compliance. Like the French style of judicial review, the British version is formally quite limited, but it also is designed to let the courts play an
important role in the political life of the nation through the power to declare
incompatibility. l56
The next chapter in the rolling constitutional revolution in Britain included the establishment of a judicial appointments commission for En··
gland and Wales in the first years of the new millenniurn'57 and then the
Constitutional Reform Act of 2005. l58 This act initiated the move of the
judicial chamber of the House of Lords out of Parliament, renaming it the
Supreme Court, thus eliminating every vestige of the ancient suggestion
that Parliament itself was supervising the judges through an appellate jurisdiction. It transferred the Lord Chancellor's judicial functions to other
members of the judiciary to make it clear that that office is no longer part of
the judicial branch.
Another major result of these changes was to subordinate the Lord
Chancellor's formerly unchecked power to appoint judges to that of the new
judicial appointments commissions. Technically, the commissions only
make recommendations to the Lord Chancellor, but they need recommend
only one name for each available position. The Lord Chancellor has the
right to reject that name, but if he does so, he must give a statement of
reasons. lS9 The members of the commissions are appointed by the secretary
of state for constitutional affairs and membership is required to be broadly
156, Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commotlweulth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J.
COMPo L. 707, 732-39 (2001).
[57. Set! generally Matleson. slIpm note 148. The Appointments Commission fm England and
Wales was announced by the British government [:1 2003. ld. CIt 39. A similar board had been
established for Scotland in 2002, Alan Paterson, Tlte Scotrish iudiciof Appointments Board: New
Wine in Old Bottles?, in ApPOINTING Jl'DGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER 13, 1--1- (Kate Mal!esan & Peter H. Russell eels., 2006), and olle was plL1nned for Northern Ireland a~ well, Malleson,
supro note 1.:1-8, at 53 n.4. Two commissions were actually establisht:d for England, one for the
Supreme COLIn, and one for nil tbe other judges. ld. at 46.
158. See, e.g., Robert Hazell, The Continuing DYflwnisl/I of COllsliruriO/wl Re.fi)J'J/l, 60 PARUA.
MENTARY AFF. 3 (2007); Diana Woodhouse, Unital Kingdom: The COllstitlltiolUd Rt1'oI'JI1 Act
2005-Df!Jellding Judicia! Independence the Ellglish Way, 5 INT'L 1. CONST. L. 153 (2007).
159. See genemlly Malleson, supra note 148, at 46-47. It is unclear what will COllnt as un
acceptable reason. It!.

,-,-".
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representative of various stakeholders in the judiciary, including lay people,
but the legal influence predominates. 160 It is too soon to determine whether
the result of these changes has been to continue executive dominance
through the office of the lord chancellor or cO create a corporatist control of
judges over the judiciary or a process of citizen control over judges in
which the executive influence is quite minimal buttbere is room for modest
play of nonpartisan political influence in the commissions. Only time will
te11.'61
D.

Chief Conclusions from Historical Sketches

The foregoing histories illustrate rather clearly tbe vigorous role tbat
political oversigbt over judges has played in modern Western democracies
and the coincidence between adoption of judicial review and adoption of
structural protections for the judges. My precise arguments, bowever, require some additional words of explanation.
While at the turn of the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries, tbe legislature may still have appeared as much of a threat to judicial independence as
the executive in both the United States and Great Britain, by the second half
of the nineteeuth century, the democratic forms of government had matured
to the point that the greater capability of the executive to exercise influence
over the judges had become apparent, as it was in France from the beginning of Napoleon's rule. All of the structural protections subsequently
adopted in France and England were aimed at diminishing executive control
or influence over the judiciary, as section II argues shonld be the case.
Section II also postulated that even mature democracies shonld preserve some role for political influence over judges. The U.S. models obvi160. See generally ie!, at 48-50. Of the Commission'ii fifteen members, three are selected by
the Judges' Council. The rest are selected through open competition, and the membership is required to be broadly representative of the various stakeholders in the judiciary. The Chairman is
required to be a lay person. Five of the remaining fourteen members must be judges, one must be
a barrister, one a solicitor, five must be lay persons, one must be a member of an administrative
tribunal, and one must be a lay justice member. JUDICIAL ApPOINTMENTS COMM'N, CHAIRMAN
AND COMMISSIONERS, bttp://www.judicialappointments.gov.uk/about/chair.htm (last visited Nov.
25, 2008).
The appointment commission for the Supreme Court is much smaller and will be convened
only as needed. It consists of tbe president of the Supreme Court, as chair, the deputy president,
and one person from each of the three U.K. appointments boards or commissions. Malleson, supra
note 148, at 46.
161. Hazell, supra note lS8, at 18 (predicting that the commission will be dominated by its
judicial membership, thus transforming the British system into kind of corporatist one); Malle-son,
supra note 148, at 39, 51. The Commission's website says that it was "set up in order to maintain
and strengthen judicial independence by taking responsitility for selecting candidates for judicial
office out of the hands of the Lord Chancellor and making the appointments process clearer and
more accountable." JUDICIAL ApPOINTMENTS COMM'N, ABOUT Us, http://www.judiciaiappointments.gov.uk/about/about.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2008), In its first year of operation, it rec-ommended 458 candidates for judicial office, and the Lord Chancellor did not reject a single one,
JUDICIAL ApPOINTMENTS COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT AND STATISTICS, http://www-judiciaJ
appointments.gov,uk/annuallannual.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
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ously fit that postulate. By contrast, one might argue that the trend in France
and Great Britain seems to be toward excluding the executive from a
largely depoliticized process in which judges exercise the greatest influence
over the selection and promotion of judges and in which judges are protected from discharge by tenure in office and quasi-judicialized disciplinary
proceedings that are also not subject to control or substantial influence by
the executive branch. If we interpret that trend as one toward complete depoliticization in favor of a bureaucratic, corporatist control of judges by
judges, my analysis in section II, the example of the largely autonomous
French judges under the ancien regime, and the current example of the Brazilian judiciary suggest that it could be a problematic one. 162
But in fact, neither country has completely eliminated political oversight, even by the executive. In France, the minister of justice is still fully in
control of most judicial promotions (except for promotions to the highest
offices), and the executive branch is also represented on the committees that
decide the highest-level appointments. With regard to administrative
judges, the executive retains full power to appoint the top ones and to discipline or dismiss all of them. In Great Britain, the Lord Chancellor retains
the power to refuse to appoint a candidate nominated for judicial office by
the appointments commission though it remains to be seen whether he will
try to use that power. Moreover, the nominating councils in Great Britain at
least are required to be broadly representative and include lay people, a
structure which allows for modest play of political influence though it may
prove to be largely controlled by its judicial members 163 Thus neither
country has yet abolished all avenues of political control over judges although Great Britain may have gone the furthest toward that position.
Perhaps the newness of the French ancl British reforms adopting structural protections for the judiciary will surprise Americans because their
founding fathers addressed these issues roughly two l)undred years earlier
in the drafting of the U.S. Constitution. The delay seems clearly related to a
difference concerning the conceptions of the role of courts in the governing
structure. The approach in the U.S. Constitution was part of a new conception of government that was based on creating a durable balance among the
three separate powers or branches of government. The British and French
were much slower to come to the view of the judiciary as a coequal branch
though they both seem to be coming to something like that view by the
beginning of the twenty-first century. The British delay may be explained in
part by the fact that their revolution took place well before the development
162. For French judges before the revolution, see supra section IV 3(b). For the Brazilian
judges, see authorities cited supra note 8. See also Provine & Garapon, Silpfa note 120, at 195 (a
U.S. and a French scholar suggesting that French judges lack legitimacy because they are not
chosen in an openly political process that links them to the public).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 159-61. The French counciLs are even more clearly
dominated by judicial members. See Kim, slIpra note 115, at 31 n.91.
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of separation of powers doctrine. 164 Perhaps the British delay could also be
ascribed in part to a feeling that structural protections were unnecessary
because the British judiciary had long had a certain degree of de facto independence rooted in the corporatist structure of the whole common law legal
system. 165 In France the heavy legacy that the courts were saddled with
from prcrevolutionary days gave the French an aversion to thinking of the
judiciary as a coequal branch; they readily accepted the idea of executive
branch supervision and control. The inauguration of judicial review of legislation in 1958 in France and in 1998 in Great Britain, seems to have
caused a reassessment of the courts' role.
For that very reason, some will therefore no doubt see the short period
of time within which all three of these countries adopted both judicial review and structural protections for the judiciary as supporting, not my broad
thesis about transfonnative law, but a narrower one to the effect that adoption of judicial review may tend to stimulate substantial support for protecting the independence of judges. I would not argue against that thesis
because it is included within the transformative law thesis. I have argued in
section III(B) that judicial review is an especially important source of transformative law. The history recounted here suggests that the adoption of judicial review does provide special force to the arguments for making the
judges independent. With powers of judicial review, judges become more
obviously the equal of the branches that make the laws. The shift in mental
paradigm goes a long way to explaining the close timing, but perhaps not
far enough.
The adoption of judicial review suffices to explain the adoption of protections for the independence of the judiciary in a system of diffuse review
like that of the United States, in which all regular courts carry out judicial
review of legislation. It is obviously problematic to subject judges to the
control of either the legislature or the executive if those are the judges who
are going to decide the constitutionality of laws created by those two
164. If by "revolution," we mean the violent overthrow of an existing pOlitical order, then the

British revolution was pretty much over by the beginning of the eighteenth century while separation of powers doctrine finds its earliest articulation in Montesquieu's Spirit of the Lmvs. Vile
gives 1748 as the date by which Montesquieu had formulated the doctdne in "recognizably modern form." MJ,C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 90 (1967).
165. Shapiro has argued tbat long before the Act of Settlement (170 I), English judges became
independent of both the king and Parliament because "[n]o one could understand the law except
the lawyers who constituted a closed guild that co-opted new members by apprenticeship. Judges
were chosen from and led the guild .... Judges were independent because they operated a system
of law that was essential to the well-being of the nation but that no one but lawyers could understand." Shapiro, Judicial Independence, supra note 21. at 624. Shapiro, however, sees the high
point of British judicial independence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, id. at 623, 630,
with the courts voluntarily subordinating themselves once again to the fused executive-legislative
branch of parliamentary government in the twentieth century, not so much by suffering greater
interference in specific cases, but by virtue of administrative law doctrines that subordinated the
courts to the policies of the administrative state. Id. at 633-52.
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branches. The same logic applies at least to the higher British judges who
have the power to make declarations of incompatibility,166 though not so
clearly to the lower courts judges who do not have that power. The same
logic also suffices to explain why in creating a specialized constitutional
court, France would provide some protection against either executive or
legislative dominance over the judges of the constitutional court by distributing the power to nominate the judges on that court equally to the president
of the republic and to each of the presidents of the two houses of parliament. But how can we explain why the French adopted structural protections for the regular judges at about the same time as they adopted judicial
review?
Perhaps it could be argued that the adoption of judicial review is an
event of such high political salience that it suffices to bring to the fore all
the important issues affecting the judiciary. But what makes the independence of the regular judiciary an issue? It cannot logically be the judicial
review that is assigned to a different body of judges. It is true that French
administrative courts have gradually been establishing the power to adjudge
the constitutionality of executive action, but even after 1958, the regular
courts were not thought to have any power to determine the constitutionality of either executive or legislative action. Stalting in 1975, the Court of
Cassation began asserting, somewhat timidly at first, the power to interpret
statutes in such a way that treaty provisions would prevail over contrary
provisions of preexisting statutes. In 1988, the Court of Cassation for the
first time relied On constitutionally guaranteed rights to interpret statutes. In
the 1980s, the top administrative court, the Council of State, which had long
used "general principles" as the basis for restrictions on administrative action, began emphasizing the constitutional basis for many of these principles, and in 1989, the administrative courts joined the regular courts in
using treaties to invalidate contrary prior legislation. Since then, both the
top regular and administrative courts have begun asserting much more aggressively what is in effect a form of judicial review based on treaty law. 167
166. Tbus Robert Hazell has argued that the new' British Supreme Court will become "more of
a constitutional COUlt," that it will consequenlly have a "much higher profile," aLld that these
developments "will stimulate much greater interest in who the judges are and how they came to be
appointed." Hazell, sltpm note 158, at 17-18.

167. For traditional powers of regular courts and adlrinistrative courts with respect to judicial
review of constitutionality of executive ancllegislative action, sec RENE DAVID, FRBNCH LAW 27,
30 (Michael Kindred tram;" 1972). For the lise of constitutional law to interpret statutes, see ALEC
STONE SWEET, GOVERN1NG WITH JllDGES 122-24 (2000). For development of review halied on
international treaties, see JEAN COMBACAU & SERGE SUR, DROIf INTERN."\TIONAL PUBLIC 187-88
(6th ed. 2004); Pierre Michel Eisemann & Raphae\e Rivier, Notio//al Trel/t)' Law al1d Pmctice:
France, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 253,269 (Duncan B. Hollis et at. cds., 2(05);
ANDREW WEST ET I-\L., THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 163-'(l4 (2d ed. (998). For the initial timidity
of the French COtHt~ in applying tl'eaty law and the more vigorom; approach led l)y the admjni~tra"
tive courts, see D1Nfl Quoc NGUYEN, PATRICK DAILUER & ALAIN PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 237 (7th ed. 2002); Emmanuel DecHux et ai., Fnll/cl', in L'INTEGJ{!',:noN !)U Dlwrr INTER-
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Thus starting at least by the late 19805, concerns about the neutrality of the
judges of the Constitutional Council would properly have applied as well to
the regular judges, who were asserting a kilCd of judicial review power. But
the main reforms to protect the regular judiciary took place between 1958
and 1968, at a time when the regular judiciary was assumed to have no role
in litigation over the constitutionality of legislation, So something like the
transformative law thesis appears to be necessm), to explain why, well
before the late 1980s and even before 1975, adoption of a constitutional
court for judicial review should result in structural guarantees of independence from the executive branch for the regular judiciary,
Perhaps my argument makes too much of a short gap in the historical
record, The transfonnative law thesis, I have said, is about a slow-acting
mechanism, Belief in the transfonnative role of law has built up slowly and
steadily in the Western legal traditions OVer quite a few centuries, Other
than the pattern of adopting structural protections for judges at about the
same time as the adoption of judicial review of legislation, I cannot point to
a pattern that reveals a close temporal connection between the adoption of
particular forms of transformative law anj structural protections for the
courts, nor do I expect to find such correspondences, But I believe that the
more transformative law is adopted in a society that really expects the law
to be enforced, the stronger will be the popular support for shielding the
courts from too much executive branch controL Maybe support for judicial
review and the new view of separation of powers, which posits a much
more powerful role of courts as an equal branch of government, builds in a
similarly slow way and could result in concerns for judicial independence
before it results in adoption of judicial review of legislation,
But even if that is true, leaving the broader category of transformative
law out of the explanation would miss a key point: Transformative law is
also an aspect of the separation of powers, That is, according to the mecha"
nism based on Shapiro's model for courts, belief in any type of transtormative law, even nonconstitutional types of transforma!ive law, should
produce a concern that substantial executive branch control over the courts
could result in preventing the law from having the desired effect of changing society, Belief in nonconstitutional transformative Jaw should thus engender the same concern for independence of the courts that constitutional
law and judicial review engender because political leaders are involved,
broadly speaking, in all legal issues that invoke important issues of social
policy, not just in those involved in constitulional review, The transformative law thesis helps us see that the change in the concept of the courts' role
that took place in each of the three coun:ries studied was not just about
judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation and executive action, It
NATIONAL P.T COMMUNAUTA1RE-DANS L'Or~DRE JURIDIr)lJE NATIONAL

Eisemann ed., [996).

241,265 (Pierre Michel
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was about the courts' roles in all types of cases that feature transformative
law, including disputes between private parties.
V.

CONCLUSIONS: THE CULTURE OF TRANSFORMATIVE LAW AND
STRATEGIES FOR FOSTERING

IT

The focus of this article has been a set of twin inquiries into some key
aspects of the cultural supports for executive dominance and the potential of
a belief in transformative law to counter political leaders' claims for control
over judges. In order to conclude this rather far-tlung investigation, this
section first draws together the discussion of various values that have been
implicated in these investigations as a first step toward defining the culture
of transformative law, and hence, by one of the chief arguments of this
paper, of the culture of judicial independence. The section then closes with
a brief exploration of the implications of the transformative law thesis for
judicial reform in Latin America by giving some examples of strategies that
could be effective if the transfOimative law thesis is valid.
A.

Some Key Values Associated with a Culture of Transformative Law

Without claiming to describe a complete catalogue of the values, attitudes, and habits of mind that are important to a culture supportive of trans ..
formative law-and by hypothesis, therefore, judicial independence-the
foregoing inquiries have revealed some of the values that appear to be most
important to this culture. Our discussion started with beliefs in the primacy
of politics and the transformative role of law, so this summary should start
there, too.
The principal hypothesis of this article is that a key value in a culture
of transformative law is the belief that law can and should be a tool for
transforming society. A culture of transformative law expects that law will
be reasonably well enforced if it is not followed. Because it can be expected
to be enforced, it can serve as a tool for reshaping society. This value thus
gives a more specific meaning to the general statement that the essence of
the rule of law is "a widespread assumption within society that law matters
and should matter." 168 It is this restatement of a rule of law value that, by
virtue of Shapiro's model for court legitimacy, provides a connection between judicial independence and the effectiveness of law in which the executive branch has an obvious interest. It is not just a claim that decisions of
courts should be enforced, though that is an important part of the idea, but
an equally important part of the idea of transformative law is that courts
will treat the transformative law as part of the body oflaw so they cun fairly
render judgments against parties in accordance with that law.
t68. Martin Krygier, MW'xisfIl and the Rille o.f Law: Reflections After ,lie Col/apse (~f COfJlIIllflIislll, [5 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 633, 646 (1990).
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Politics and law have a complex relationship, but one aspect of that
relationship. even in a democracy, jl1volves a competitive tension, especially with regard to judges. The rule of law ideal suggests that judges
should be sufficiently independent of political authority to decide cases according to law and not according to politics, yet we and especially our political leaders also want some assurance that judges' decisions will not be
based on political values so far from the electoral majority who put the
leaders in office that they will unduly ob,truct the policies of the elected
branches of government. Even as we accept some degree of obstruction as
the inevitable result of judicial independence, we also tend to insist on some
degree of political influence over judges. Political influence can come from
many different sources, but the executive branch is generally best organized
to project political influence over the jUdiciary. For that reason, the executive branch tends to pose the major threat to judicial independencc, even in
a democracy. There are many reasons why the citizenry may wish to give
power over the courts to the executive branch or to tolerate executive dominance over the courts, but they all amount to one major claim of the primacy of politics over law~typically, that. the current situation is so difficult
or dangerous that the executive needs to be able to assert its political leadership without interference by the courts. Because belief in the importance of
the guiding role of a strong political leader is not confined to authoritarian
societies, we have to have a healthy respect for politics as part of the culture
of tranSfUrIllalive law. Judicial reform to strengthen judicial independence
should not therefore seek complete independence from political influence,
but only enough to preserve the courts' central claim to be able to decide
individual cases according to law, not pol;tics 169
169, This article focuses on culture, not On design of judicial institutions, but our discllssion
permits llS to see the outlines of the cllief dilemmas for this kind of design issue. Instead of
eliminating political influence altogether, the goal should be a reasonable bahmce between political influence and judicial independence so tbat neither political influence over the judges nor the
judges' ability to decide cases according to Inw (and not just according to politics) is completely
eliminated. Because executive power over sittingjllCiges can so easily eliminate any appearance of
judicial independence, finding the light balance might seem a simple matter of allowing executive
influence over judicial appointments but eliminating executive power to discipline or dismi~s
judges after appointment and giving judges long, nonrenewable or lifetime terms. Such systems
permit a degree of political influence over judges without allowing the executive to retaliate
against the judges for specific decisions. The tendency in all legal systems, however, for judges to
seek promotions to new judgeships complicates the problem. The power not to promote is almost
as strong a power to discipljne judges as the power to dismiss. Eliminating execlltive power entirely from the appointment, promotion, and c1iscipli11<lry process might seem an attractive solution, but the sorts of judicial councils that are typically substituted for the executive may too easily
become corporatist bodies controlled by the judges and impervious to political influence. Finding
the right balance appears quite difficult indeed, and for that reason, I dOUbt that anyone model is
the optimum solution for every society. But see Mary L. Volcant:ek, ApPOinting Judges the European Way, 34 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 363 (2007) (arguing that the European methods of judicial
selection, whicb she chanlcterizes as either bureaucratic or as shared appointment systems, typically with quotas, are the best).
."-~~-.
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The important role that judicial review plays in the adoptiou of structural protections for judicial independence shows that another important
value in the culture of transformative law is belief in the value of separation
of powers, and it is that value which is especially important for countering
excessive claims by political leaders to concentrate power at the expense of
the courts. Lord Acton's famous dictum that "[plower tends to corrupt and
absolute power corrupts absolutely" appears to state an eternal truth. Together with regular elections, separation of power and various systems of
checks and balances are democracy's principal defenses against overweening political power. The discussion in section IV(D) shows that when judicial review was adopted. popular support for the courts' checking powers
was apparently not limited to cases involving constitutional review. Thus
the understanding that through their broad powers of interpretation, the
courts can shape the law, even statutory law, in ways that ultimately provide some check on the power of the political branches appears to be part of
the culture of transformative law. '70
170. Some scholars have argued that true judicial independence requires a certain critical approach to the law itself, especially the statutory law. FriIhling, supm note la, at 243, 250 (Chilean
courts failed to show independence from Pinochct regime by investigating human rights abuses
because "they abdicated their duty to interpret and develop the law to uphold democratic principles"; Lo be sufficiently independent to defend human rights, Latin American courts need "to
undertake a critical interpretation of rules passed by their legislatures"); Kim Lane Scheppeie,
iJedarations of independence: Judicial Rew.:tiuns to Political Pressure, in JUDICIAL INDEPEN
DENCE AT THE CROSSROADS 227 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002) (extreme
positivism, unleavened by constitutional principle!) or general principles of justice, results in making the courts jmt as dependent on the political powers that promulgate the written law as if those
powers dictated directly to the courts in individual cases).
I have no doubt that this kind of "independence" from the ht\.v is an important aspect of
judicial independence. It should be noted that traditional Islamic law courts appear to have enjoyed this kind of independence at times, too, and probably to a very large degree in view of the
indeterminate method of finding the law described above in section III(D). See ROSEN, ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTlCE, supra note 20, at 66-67 (examples from Islamic law of decisions in which the
qadi manipulates or ignores the legal rules to achieve what he believes to be a more just result).
But the question for purposes of reform is how much judicial independence from the positive
law is to be encouraged. A,> I argued in section III{D), too much indeterminacy in the law finding
process, as in traditional Islamic courts, wOllld seem to destroy the utility of law as a tool of social
transformation. Perhaps some general reforms of legal education aimed at coullteracting traditions
of excessive legal positivism could be worthwhile. B'Jt reforms aimed at increasing in general the
degree to which judges feel free to modify or nullify the effect of statutory law based on the
constitution or general legal principle could destabilize the legal system. Reformers may want
judges to give real effect to constitutional provisions on hUman righls, for example, despite an
inadequate statutory basis for doing so, but they do not want jl\(lges to view statutes as blank slates
upon which to write their own versions of law. Frilhling, a professor of political science at the
University of Chile, questions whether Latin American courts have the legitimacy necessary to
adopt sllch a critical stance toward statutory law. Frlihling, SUpr<l note 10, at 250.
The best course for reform is to concentrate on specific cases. Thus in section V(B), I suggest
eff01ts to make certain types of lnw ill Ultin America more effective. Those efforts could, in
appropriate cases, include specific arguments bnsed en constitutional or general principles to modify the apparently inadequate or contrary st,ttutory law to reach a result more in accord with basic
principles of justice.
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This article has looked at ancient Chinese and traditional Islamic law
in order to use the stark contrast with very different systems to highlight
features of the familiar Western legal systems whose importance might otherwise not strike us as clearly. Two features of these non-Western legal
systems that stand out in that contrast are (1) an extreme degree of personalism in the dominant mode of thinking about human relationships and (2) the
consequent potential for unequal application of the law, whether because
the laws expressly distinguish among social classes, as in dynastic Chinese
law, or because of a personalistic method of applying law, as in traditional
Islamic law. By contrast, we can see that the transformative law culture in
the Western legal traditions of the civil and common law is based on an
ideal that insists on the equal treatment of people through an impersonal
manner in applying law. Law tends to be regarded primarily as a system of
formal distinctions, and to that extent, Western law does not ask the court to
look at each party as a whole person with all her social and family ties, but
only as a person abstracted to the specific features that the applicable law
calls out as relevant in the specific case. 71 The rule of law adopts impersonal application of law in an effort to ensure that law is applied equally to
all persons who come within the terms of the law. The ability and willingness to deal with people on an impersonal basis is thus linked to a very
limited or basic aspect of equality having to do with the equal application of
law.
While varying degrees of personalism are no doubt found in every
society, personalism is inconsistent with a culture of transformative law
when it is so strong that one cannot expect law to be applied by its terms
when it conflicts with the treatment that one party owes another party or the
judge owes the parties based on personal or family connections, or rank or
status. Seotion lII(D) above has argued that there is some evidence suggesting that personalistic systems of caudillismo may continue to be strong
enough in some Latin American countries to be an obstacle to judicial reforms to strengthen transformative law.
Factors that would appear to work against extremely personalistic cultures include the expanding role for bureaucracy in governments and in
large businesses. Impersonal application of law by the state bureaucracy is
part of the development by which modern states project bureaucratic power
over social divisions based on more traditional societal ties of family, clan,
and tribe. Modern business places similar expectations on its bureaucracies.
To enable efficient action in markets, bureaucracies are expected to function largely according to internal rules and directions promulgated by the
171. There is of course a contrary trend within the Western legal traditions, linked to equity
within the common law tradiLion tlnd to general principles of Jaw within the civil law tradition,
that prefers to see law as a series of principles LO be applied with sensitivity to the social context,
rather than formal rules to be applied rigorously according to its terms, but that is not the domi~
nllnt approach in tbe Western legal traditions, especially in applying statutes.
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business's leaders, not primarily according to the personal relations among
the bureaucrats or between them and outsiders. Strengthening a culture of
impersonal bureaucratic interactions would seem likely to strengthen a similar culture among jurists, including judges, in the long run. While the
prominent role that politics plays in the selection of U.S. judges somewhat
obscures this pattern, judges in most countries, as illustrated by the histories
in section IV for both France and Great Britain, are part of a specialized
bureaucracy and are selected and supervised in largely bureaucratic fashion.
The development of transformative law and judicial independence thus ap··
pears to be linked to the development of a culture of impersonal bureaucratic action in all its forms in both state and private sectors. 172
Finally, this inquiry into transformative law and cultures that are not
characterized by transformative law suggests an important-though less direct-relationship to the general idea of equality. I have already claimed
that the impersonal and formal method of applying law to individuals by
considering only their traits that are made relevant by the applicable law is a
very basic form of equal treatment. But it does not of course follow that all
societies committed to such an impersonal application of law that they can
adopt transformative law are necessarily committed to a broad equality
principle. Clearly, transformative law can just as easily be used to increase
inequality as decrease it. Think, for example, of laws adopted by the Nazi s
to purge the German civil service of Jews. 173 Transformative law is a tool to
decrease inequality only if it is specifically designed to do so.
But it often is, and that is the connection between transformative law
and judicial independence, on the one hand, and equality, on the other.
Many examples of transformative law are adopted for the purpose of increasing equality. For example, the two instances of transformative law
172. Globallzation of trade unci investment, if it continues to be sustained, may provide some
encouragement to reformers seeking to strengthen judicial independence. Multinational corporations bring their bureaucratic organization to the countries in which they do business. If local
businesse:; are able to respond with market competition, they <lIsa will be pushed to adopt a more
impersonal, market-based style. Thus it seems quite likely that both liberalization and globalization of the economy wi!! eventually expose large parts of the population of a given country to the
impersona!ism of market-based, business bureaucracies. This exposure could help moderate the
extreme forms of personalism that may still be found in some Latin American countries though
reform efforts afe needed to hasten this process. Economic reforms to encourage the growth of
private business may thus do much to strengthen key values of a culture of transfonnati ve law and
judicial independence. Cf John Reitz, Export of the Rule of LaH', 13 TRANsNAT'L L. & CONTElVIP.
PROBS. 429, 472-74 (2003) (arguing that development of commercial law could be an engine to
develop the rule of law culture). The development of governmental bureaucracy is not by itself
necessarily benign. For example, the kind of "bureaucratic authoritarianism" to which Guillermo
O'Donnell hilS pointed in Latin AmericCi moves in the opposite direction by leading to authoritarianism instead of democracy and a state-dominated economy instead of liberalization. See GUILLERMO O'DONNELL, MODERNIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIC-AuTl-IOR!TARJANlSM (1973).
173. LINDER, SlIpr[/ note 40, at 147-50 (describing the "Law pertaining to the Restoration of
the Professional Civil Service (BBG) of 7 April 1933." which providd for the retirement of all
tenured civil servants of non-Aryan descent, and other related laws that gradually prohibited Jews
from positions in government <lnd from quite a few p:·ivate sectors of the economy).

--- - . _ - - - - - - - -
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cited at the beginning of section III, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, are both intended to increase
formal and substantive equality by eliminatiLlg certain forms of discrimination against women and racial minorities and against the disabled, respectively. Moreover, the goal of increasing equality may be a politically
attractive one, especially in today's world, strongly influenced by international human rights discourse, in which principles of equality playa leading
role. Transformative law for the purpose of expanding equality may therefore be likely to attract substantial public support. Such transformative law
seems most likely to set up the type of dynamic described in section III that
could lead to substantial support for curbing undue executive influence over
the courts. Law that seeks to transform society by expanding equality is
thus an especially important type of transfo1l11ative law. There are grounds
to think that the ideal of equality is not well supported on the whole in Latin
America, 174 but efforts to strengthen the implementation of transformative
law that already exists in Latin America could be a particularly effective
way to strengthen the social commitment to equality and thus increase social support for transformative law. In the next and last section of the article, we will look at some examples of this kind of law in Latin America that
might offer an especially useful basis for reform efforts attempting to
strengthen the transformative law cultnre in various Latin American
countries.
B.

Examples of Reform Strategies for Strengthening the Culture of
Transformative Law and Judicial Independence ;n Latin
America

This article has focused on the social and political logic of popular
support for judicial independence in a democracy for the purpose of developing strategies for reforms that could use that logic to strengthen popular
support for judicial independence from the extremes of executive control.
The article has proposed belief in the transformative role of law as a key
174. I do not know whether one can say that Latin American culture generally lacks sufficient
commitment to equality, see, e.g., Rosenn, supra note 10, at 35 (suggesting that commitment to
equality is too superficial in Latin America to SUppOlt an independent judiciary), but Latin American society remains characterized by enormolls economic and social inequalities. Jorge DomInguez, The Politics of Hope: Free Politics and Free Markets in Larin America, 5 U. ST. THOMAS
LJ. 625 (2009). Latin America experienced a revival of democratic governance at the end of the
twentieth century, and democracy suggests substantially egalitarian thinking, but democracies
bave not proven to be very stable in Latin America in the. nineleenth and twentieth centuries. In
the twentieth century, Latin America has also been strongly influenced hy forms of wcial and
political organization known as "corporatism," essentially a theory that society should be composed of groups, each of which had specific functions and the fights ancl obligations that relate to
those functions, Although corporatism takes a variety of forms, in most case::; it rejected egalitarianism, teaching that inequality i::; part of the natural oreler. LEWIS, supra note 40, at 129-31. To
the extent that way of thinking is ::;til1 important in Latin America, it represents a fUJ1her obstacle
to reform based on transformative law.

--------------
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value which has the potential to engender that kind of popular support. I
would suppose that many kinds of reform strategies could be devised to
take advantage of the logic discussed in this article, but there is space here
to discuss only a few examples. It is important to preface this discussion
with the caveat that I am not arguing that belief in transformative law will
quickly or easily lead to formation of a culture supportive of greater degrees
of judicial independence. My argument is only that a culture that adopts law
for the purpose of changing society sets up the dynamic that Shapiro has
described. In time, it seems likely that this dynamic should induce popular
support for judicial freedom from executive dominance.
One clear implication of the historical sketch in section IV is that
roughly around the time of adoption of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation there is likely to be a rethinking of the role of courts that
creates significant popular support for curbing executive power over the
regular courts, and this seems to be true whether or not judicial review is
confined to a constitutional court. The period of adoption of judicial review
has already passed in a literal sense for many Latin American countries
because they adopted judicial review of the constitutionality of both legislative and executive action some time ago. However, in many countries, judicial review has not prospered, and Latin American history is littered with
attempts to suppress or restrict constitutional review. 175 In countries that
have experienced significant curtailment of judicial review and have not yet
succeeded in reestablishing a credible form of judicial review, there is an
opp011unity to renew the commitment to judicial review in ways that might
bring the issue of executive domination of the judiciary to the top of the
political agenda and cause a reconsideration of the courts' role as a third
branch of government equal to the other two branches. Thus working to
establish or strengthen judicial review of legislation may have the potential
in some countries to strengthen support for greater independence of the judiciary as a whole.

175. For example, Argentina has witnessed the rOlltine repJucement en masse of its supreme
court after each regime change from the 1930& through the 1980s, foHowecJ by President-Elect
Carlos Menem's court-packing scheme in 1990, Gretchen Helmke, The Logic of Strategic Defectioll: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy, 96 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 291, 292 (2002); see aIm Robert Barros, Courts Ollt of Context: Allthorirarian SOl/rees
of Judicia! FClilllre ill Chile (/973-1990) and Argentina (1976-1983), in RULE BY LAW 156lTom
Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008) [hereina:ter "RULE BY LAW"]; Lisa Hilbink, Agetlts of
Allti-Politics: COllrts in Pinochet's Chile, il1 RULE BY LAW 102; Bentriz Magaloni, Enforcing the
Autocratic Po(itica{ Order olld the Role of Courts: The Case of Me.rico, in Ruu:: BY LAW 180
(how Mexican presidents from the 19303 to 199..:. manipulated the constitution and the courts):
Anthony W. Pereira, Of Judges ami Gt'nerals: Security COllrTS Under Autlwritaritm Regimes ill
ArgeJ1tilla, Bra,;.!I, alld Chile, in RULE BY LAW 23 I,use of special courts to take sensitive cases out
of jurisdiction of regular COLlt'ts); Schor, supm note 14, at 4 (example,'; rmm Mexico, Venezuela,
Peru, Argentina, and Ecuador of president,'; who attempted to manipulate their constitutions andlor
supreme courts),

---------
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Another part of public law that seems particularly promising is administrative law though it must be conceded tllat the historical sketch in section
IV may seem to suggest the contrary. Both Great Britain and France developed judicial review of administrative action in the nineteenth century, but
France did not adopt significant structural protections for the independence
of the regular judiciary until the second half of the twentieth century, and
Great Britain followed even later. France tinally adopted some structural
protections for the lower administrative court judges in the 1990s, but it still
preserves a disciplinary system for the administrative court judges that
threatens them with political control and subjects the judges of the highest
administrative court to blatant political control in both their selection and
discipline. As a motor for driving the development of a more independent
judiciary, administrative law would appear fairly ineffectual.
But judicial review of administrative action fits Shapiro's model in a
compelling way. The govel'l1ment is a formal party to every case. Moreover,
these kinds of cases involve regulation, which, as I have conceded, 176
means generally the same thing as transformative Jaw and tends to involve
politically salient law. The executive is thm both formally and substantively
an interested party in most cases. Executive control over the courts should
be obviously troublesome for the broad public affected by judicial review.
Perhaps in an earlier day, governments could get away with providing for
judicial review of administrative action in courts they controlled. The prestigious French system was developed from a model of administrative justice
that was restricted to asking a higher body within the administration itself to
take another look at challenged administrative action.177 But the French
model has developed into a case of true judicial review, as the recent adoption of structural protections for the lower administrative comi judges suggests, and it is becoming less and less acceptable throughout the world to
restrict review of administrative action to a second look by higher levels of
the administration. Today, even the few countries still ruled by communist
parties see the need to provide judicia/review of administrative action as a
way of bolstering regime legitimacy. 178 Popular desire to be protected from
arbitrary and illegal administrative action may be propelling judicial review
of at least some signiticant forms of administrative action into the ranks of a
legal universal. 179 Efforts to strengthen judicial review of administrative
176. See supm section III(C).
177. That model helps explain why the nineteenth-century French thought that review by a
body within the administration, the judicial chamber of the Council of State, was a sufficient form
of review. See supra section IVCB).

178.

KARIN BUHMANN, IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RI0C'lTS THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW RE"

469, 561 (2001) (China anel Vietnam).
179. Cf. John Reitz, Progress in Bllilding In:aifuliol1s for the Rule (~f Law, il1 DEMOCRATIC
THEORY AND POST-COMMUNIST CHANGE 144, 159-62 (Robert Greyed., 1997) (describing the
"long historical roots" of judiciall'cview of administrative acts in socialist COUll tries and the rapid
expansion of that kind of judicial review after 1989 in Russia and Poland).
FORMS: THE POTENTIAL IN CHINA AND VIETNAM
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action by trying to increase the degree to which it actually protects individuals from arbitrary government action should therefore be an effective way
to build support for reasonable levels of judicial independence from the
government, at least over the long term. 180
Finally, the discussion of the connection between transformative law
and equality suggests that strategies of promoting law reform in areas that
seek to expand equality ought to be particularly effective at building public
support for judicial independence from executive control. In this connection, Jorge Esquirol names three areas of substantive law as representing
lasting achievements of Latin American law-he calls them part of the acquis Legaux in Latin America-labor law, the social function doctrine in
property law, and economic and social rights that have been recognized as
constitutional rights. lSi These examples all appear to involve transformative
law that seeks to expand equality. Working to secure a just and effective
implementation of the rules in these areas of law-perhaps by educating
lawyers and judges, amending the law to eliminate problems or defects with
the law, educating the public, devising arguments to use constitutional or
general principles of law to modify or supplement statutory terms that are
lacking in justice, 182 and facilitating the formal assertion of rights under the
180. Most important cases are said to be in the ad:ninistrative

COLlrts

in Latin America, not in

the regular courts. Jorge Santistevan de Noriega, Reform of the Latin American Judicia!)l, 16 FLA.
1. 1NT'L L. 161 (2004).
181. EsC]uirol, supra nole 3, at 118-24. It is clear enough how labor law and economic and
social rights that have the status of constitutional rights represenl attempts to transform society
and expand equality. The social functjon doctline of property law is illustrated by the Brazilian
Federal Constitution of 1988 and the new Brazilian Civil Code of 2002, both of which adl)pted a
concept of properly as having socia! and environmental fl1nction~, as well as individual economic
functions. Daniela Diz & Lars T. Soeflesta.d, W(Jfer Resources as a Common Good if! Brazil:
Legal Reform Bet,veer! Theory and Pmcrice (2004), (!Wlilable at Digita! Library of the Commons,
http://d1c.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/OOOO 1529100/Diz_Watec040806.pdf (pro petty rights have to
be exercised in accordance with economic and social aims to preserve the environment); Ngai
Pindell, Finding (I Right to the City: Exploring Property and Community in Bro::.iI and in tile
United States, 39 V AND. 1. TRANSNAT'L L. 436, 452-55 (2006) (Articles 182 and 183 of the 1988
Brazilian Constitution tie the social fUllction of property to master plan process for urban land use,
and the City Statute of 2001 provides for implementation of those constitutional rules so that,
under certain circumstances, squatters can gain a legal right to use bOlh private and public land). If
it is correct that the issue of squatters' rights presents a risk of extreme politicization that could
cause the Brazilian military to intervene again in political life, see Daniel Zirkel', Property Rights,
Democrati;.{/fiol1, alld Military Politics in Brazil, 33 1. POL. & MIL. Soc. 125 (2005), perhaps that
issue might not be a reasonable one on which to base reform efforts. Reformers have to pick their
battles with an eye toward protecting the courts. But the social funclion doctrine appears to be
suitabk for application across a broad spectrum of property issues, and the environmental applications may be more likely to engender broad public SLlpport. It should be noted that "[t]he 19~8
Constitution was drafted at a time wben the belief in the transformative power of law was at its
height and the Brazilian government played a central role in ordering economic and socia! development," Megan Bullard, The crtlsh Benl'l'en Local Courtj' tlnd Gloha{ Economics: The Politics of
Judiciul Reform ill Bra::JI, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 230, 247 (1999) (cited in Pindell, slipra. at
452), so the doctrine at' sl~ciaJ function represents abollt us clear an example of transformati ve law
as one can imagine.
18'2. Sa SlIprd note 170 (regarding judicial "independenl'e" from positive law).
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law by making counsel available or securing evidence-is therefore likely
to contribute significantly to building a culture of transformative law and
judicial independence, and if these really do constitute part of the acquis
legaux in Latin America, efforts devoted to these areas are likely to be supported by a substantial part of the population.
I recognize that there is a certain "chicken and egg" quality to these
recommendations. For a country in which the executive branch exerts too
much influence over the judges, judicial review based on constitutional
rights Of nonconstitutional administrative law, labor law, or the social function doctrine of property would all no doubt be more effective if the judges
were more independent, and yet I am urging that efforts be made to
strengthen judicial independence by strengthening the effectiveness of the
law. Which comes first, the office of the judge or the judge's function in
these various areas of law? The answer of course is that they are so interrelated that neither comes before the other. We have to work on both at the
same time. The main point is that for too long legal refofm efforts have
concentrated 011 trying to influence the substantive functioning of law by
concentrating on institutional reforms. Those efforts are important, but not
sufficient. Reform also has to address the substantive functioning of the law
because that is what builds popular support for the courts in their continual
battle against the threat of executi ve dominance.
In the end, however, the success of reform efforts aimed at the courts
depends on the judges themselves and on the quality of their decisions. We
cannot escape that fact. But it also leads us to consider a kind of miracle. In
the midst of his argument that judges cannot and will not be free of governmental control and right after listing the ways that various regimes have
undercut judicial independence, Shapiro writes, "the prevalence of these ...
tactics is testimony to the real independence of judiciaries. In many nations
at many times judges have been sufficiently their own masters to require
even highly centralized regimes to adopt special tactics to avoid sharing
power with them."l83 That despite strong political influence, some judges
assert their independence to decide cases before them as they think the law
requires without yielding to political pressure is testimony to their dedication to the ideal of deciding cases under law, not politics. This kind of
judicial behavior may actually make the greatest contribution to promoting
popular support for judicial independence. To those judges this article is
dedicated.

183,

SHAPIRO,

supra note 17, at 34.

